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BROWN, JAMES SOOIT, I=h.D. Family Power an:i Decision-Makin;J: Beyom the 
Husbarn-Wife Dyad. (1988) Directed by Dr. Rebecca M. Smith. 139 pp. 
'Ihe major conceptual focus of this research was to exparxl 
systematically the investigation of family power beyon:i the marital dyad. 
'Ihe pw:poses of the study were (a) to test two theories of coalition 
formation in families, arxi (b) to test the reliability an:i validity of an 
instrument designed for measurirx;J family coalitions. 
Usirx;J data from 24 two-parent, two-children, nonclinical families, 
this research examined the types of coalitions an:i the corxiitions un:ier 
which they develop in a conflictual family decision-mak..in} situation. 
'Ihe data were collected via questionnaires, face-to-face intel:views, arxi 
videotaped family interactions. 
Of the six hypotheses developed from the two coalition formation 
theories, only one was supported. In this sample, families with strong 
parental coalitions ten:ied to have stron;Jer siblin:;J coalitions tban 
parent-child coalitions. 'Ihe data failed to show any particular 
coalition pattem between the weaker parent am the children. No 
empirical evidence was founi to support the predominance of parent-child 
aver dlild-child coalitions under the con:iitions of nearly equal status 
parents without a stron;J parental coalition. Neither age differences nor 
sex differences in the siblirx;J pair proved to be related to the strength 
of the siblirx;J coalition. 'Ihe fin:iin:1s Wicated that coalition patterns 
a~ to maintain power differences between parents an::i children am 
mothers received more support than any other family member. 
However, it cannot be claimed that the coalition theories have been 
tested adequately since the deperrlent variable did not prove to be valid. 
Family coalitions, measured by the proportion of supportive statements 
made between dyads in a family, was not corz:oborated by either clinical 
ol:lservation of videotaped family ~teraction or family members' written 
reports of family coalitions, po~'ler, ani decision outcomes. Furthermore, 
the experimental task of a 10-minute family decision about the use of a 
given sum of money probably could not measure subtle ani real power am 
coalitions in famUies. However, this research added an important step 
in the c::ontinuiD] effort to develop valid ard :reliable measures of fam:i. 1.y 
power. 'Ihe observation ard videotaping of whole famUies made an 
important contribution to family research methodology. 
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atAPI'ER I 
INmOWcriON AND REVIEW OF LITERA'lURE 
Family power relationships am decision-makin; patterns have 'been 
topics of major interest to family scholars for at least two decades or 
l0ll3'er. However, a number of scholars have identified significant 
limitations in the research in these areas. Safilios-Rothschild (1970), 
in reviewin;J family power research, concluded that theories about power 
structw:e would not become more sophisticated until they included all 
aspects of power ani from the point of view of all contr.il:nltin;J family 
members. A decade later Mcrxmald (1980) noted explicitly that one major 
conceptual problem has been the continued usage of the term "family 
power" when, in fact, the unit of analysis was the hl.lsbam-wife dyad. He 
argued that such studies systematically excluded the possible power of 
children ani other members of the kinship network. McDonald reiterated 
Safilios-Rothschild's earlier position ani stressed the importance of 
examinin;J power relationships between siblin;Js arxi parents, among 
siblir~s, am amon:J exterxied family members. McDonald concluded: 
We need an explicit concem for collective IX>Wer dynamics ani 
coalitional processes in lTAlltiple-l'lallber family groups. If "family 
p:Mer'' is truly to be studied, systematic efforts must be made to 
e.xpmi irwestigation beyond the marital dyad. (p. 851) 
'!he c::onti.nuin:J focus on the husbarxl-wife power relations ani 
decision-maldn;J processes has occurred largely because of theoretical ani 
methodological limitations. szinovacz (1987) identified the neglect of 
coalition formation as one major shortcoming of past family power 
reseaJ:Ch. To study coalition formation in families means to study family 
2 
processes which are embedded in family histoty, subject to constant 
c:han:]e, an:i most likely vary over different family domains. In 
conceptualizin; an:i measur~ family coalitions we cannot ignore past 
relationship histoty or Ol'l3'CinJ exch.an;Je processes. We cannot even trust 
that the behavior patterns revealed by our subjects durin; a game 
situation in the laboratoty adequately represent their behavior patterns 
''behin:i closed doors" (M. szinovacz, personal communication, November 3, 
1986). 
Coalition theoty (Blood, 1972; Caplow, 1968; Collins & Raven, 1969; 
Gamson, 196la, 196Jb; Kahan & Rapoport, 1984; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957), as 
developed initially to explain behavior in small groups, has proven 
effective for the analysis of family power. '11le purpose.c:; of this study 
were (a) to test hypotheses derived from coalition theoty as they apply 
to the family group, (b) to test the viability of a decision-makin;J game 
for simulatin] family decision-makin;J pl:"'O?~ses, an:i (c) to test the 
reliability an:i validity of a measure of coalitions in families. 
statement of the Problem 
'11le family exerts a powerful influence on its members, especially 
the children, yet few measures exist which assess family interaction as a 
whole. Most measures of family interaction have assessed only the 
interaction of the husbani-wife dyad ani the mother-child dyad or have 
centered on families with a behavior-disordered child. Interaction 
measures for whole normal (nonclinical) families which do exist often 
have limited reliability ani validity or are difficult ani tilne 
cansumin;J. 'Ihe major objective of this study of whole I'KlrClinical 
families was to provide a valid arxi reliable measure of power which 
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identifies the variety of coalitions formed in normal families. In 
addition, this study was designed to generate empirical evidence to 
ch.allen:Je the belief that coalitions other than parent-parent coalitions 
are pathological. 
Most research on coalitions in the family has assumed that parent-
child ani s.ililin;J coalitions are pathological (Goffman, 1969; I..ain:;r & 
Esterson, 1964; L:i.dz, 1973). 'lhe implication is that arrt stron:;J 
coalition besides the parent-parent coalition upsets the :balance of 
power. E\lrthermore, it is implied that a weak parent-parent coalition 
allows parent-child coalitions and child-child coalitions to form. SUch 
coalitions are viewed as dysfunctional. Yet to the extent that parent-
c::hild ani child-child coalitions in stable nonclinical families exist, 
ani can be predicted, the assumption that they are pathological is 
unwarranted. 
Much of the research on decision makin;J has used tenets of social 
exc:h.an;e theo:cy (Scanzoni, 1979; 'Ihibaut and Kelley, 1959). From this 
theoey it is assumed that suggestions made by family members are heard as 
alternatives for choices ani that the decision to accept or reject the 
suggestion will be based on some ratio of cost am reward. It is further 
assumed by exchan;e theoey that an agreement with a suggestion is 
rewan:Un;r. When a person receives agreement from several family members, 
it can be assumed that power resides in that person or collective power 
resides in that dyad, triad, or group. '1bese ag u;o~_ments between family 
members can be conceptualized as c:r..aUt.i.ons. Coalitions are formed when 
a person decides to join another person in a joint use of resan:ces after 
decidin;r that such. an art'ai'qement wc:W.d be profitable. 
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'Ibis study examined the decision-makin;J processes of two-parent, 
intact, nonclinical families with two children. '!be major research 
questions addressed were: (a) Umer what c:::omitions do parent coalitions 
form in l'lOI"clinical families? (b) umer what cornitions do s:iblin;1 
coalitions form in nonclinical families? arxi (c) Unjer what COIXti.tions do 
parent-child coalitions form in nonclinical families? 
Information generated from this study of two-parent nonclinical 
families should provide a benchmark or normative group to which family 
professionals can compare other groups of families with special 
ci.rcumstances or needs. '!be ultimate goals of the study were to refine 
inst.nunents which can be used to assess families in clinical am research 
settjn;Js, am to leam more about family interaction patterns. More 
information is needed about positive family models am what healthy 
families are like to better inform our efforts to ~ families in 
distress. '!be two purposes of this study, therefore, were (a) to test 
two theories of coalition formation in families, am (b) to test the 
reliability am validity of an instrument designed for measurirg fcunily 
coalitions. 
SCope of the study 
'!his research was part of a lcu:ger study on interaction patterns of 
normal (nonclinical) families. Finarx::ial support was provided through a 
University of North carolina Junior Faculty Development Aww.-cL '!be 
principal investigator of the fun:U!d project was Nancy J. Warren, fh.D., 
Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, University of North 
carolina at (j)apel Hill. 
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In addition to family decision-makinq processes, other aspects of 
family interacti.on were examined. Observations of family play 
interaction were coded by usirq the Family Interaction Ratir.g System 
(FIP.S) developed ani tested by Warren et al. (1983) in earlier research 
with nonclinical, sin:;Jle-parent families. Further 1:estin] of the 
reliability ani validity of the FIRS was c::omucted usin;J the data 
generated from the nonclinical, two-parent families. 
Fizxti.r'gs from this larger study of nonclinical, two-parent fm:1ilies 
have :been compared to results from studies of two other groups of 
families: nonclinical sirqle-parent falllil.ies arxi families in which there 
is a severely d.i.stul:bed, hospitalized child. Differences in family 
interaction pattems of these three groups have been examined ani an 
assessment has been made to determine the ability of the developed 
measures to detect clinica1 problems in families. 
'lbe focus of the present study is one component of the larger study. 
'1h:is part of the larger study is more narrow and specific to family power 
am decision-makin;J processes. In particular, this research attempted to 
define ani assess the concept of coalitions in families usin;J multiple 
family members in the process. '1he often nEglected issues of reliability 
and validity, which are crucial in this area, were addressed. 'lhis 
research tested theoretical assumptions about the nature of coalition 
development in families, as q:posed to merely descr.ibirq the phenomena. 
Finally, this research included obsel:vational as well as self-report 
data. 
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Conceptual ani Methodological Issues 
Conceptual Issues 
Although Sprey (1975) argued that family researchers are at a ''pre-
paradigmatic11 stage of development in their efforts to make theoretical 
sense of power in families, he still attempted to define power as an 
attribute of individuals or of relationships. He questioned the 
analytical fruitfulness of his individual categocy but contended that 
power as a relational concept had greater potential for explaining 
in~ relationships in families. 
Sprey (1975) raised a number of critical questions related to the 
organization of power in families. For example, he worxiered how to 
aooount for the power of the powerless in marriages ani families. He 
also woniered how individuals without authority or other resources manage 
'to influence the family decision-making process. He cited as exair.ples 
housewives in patriarchal families ani children in most families. Sprey 
argued that the availability of a given resource is a necessary con:lition 
for its use: but the absence of a resource among other family members may 
sel:Ve to limit or neutralize its usefulness for those who do have access 
to it. An example might be a child's use of ignorance to counteract a 
parent's eJq>ertise in a given dispute. 
Other researchers have expressed concerns about the language of 
family power in that it usually refers to individual power potential or 
influence effectiveness rather than to some property unique to the family 
group itself. Weiting an:i Mclaren (1975) noted ti1.at when information is 
required about evecy member of a group ani then individual relationships 
to the whole group or each other part is needed, the technology of 
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research becomes complex am delnan:iin:J. Although laboriws am 
expensive, research involvin;J lorq-term and repeated observations of 
operatin;J family units may hold tremenlolls potential for determinirx] the 
:rules govemi.n;J the power operations of family groups. 
Broderick (1975) has also been interested in the rules or governance 
of :power in family groops. He suggested that the importance of power as 
a facet of interaction varies not only from family to family, but within 
families, from topic to topic an:i relationship to relationship. Common 
obselvation suggests that families do not operate consistently in a 
sin;Jle mode, but vary aver time am situation. Broderick conterxied that 
the family can be descr.ilied usefully only if each major area of decision-
mald..n; is evaluated separately am if the husbarxi-wife relationship is 
viewed separately from parent-child am siblin;J inter-relationships. 
Olson, cromwell am Klein (1975) conc:luded that the complexity of 
family power has to date eluded even the best of studies because of the 
failure to deal with the numerous conceptual am methc::dological issues. 
Investigators of family power have approached the phenomenon with ideas 
which restricted their perception to only parts of the issue, with little 
~ about how these parts fit together into one integrated 
system. 
Szinavacz (1987) addressed the issue of lack of clarity regard.i.rv;J 
the const:ruct of family power by proposin;J the followin;J definition: 
Power is defined as the net ability or capability of actors (A) to 
p%Oduce or cause (in'tenjed) outcomes or effects, particularly on the 
behavior of others (0) or on others' outcomes. (p. 652) 
'1he majority of studies of power within the family have focused on the 
power of parents. sutton-Smith am Bosenberq (1968) noted that such 
8 
awroadles explain events within a social system (the falllil.y) in terms of 
only one type of agent within that system (the parents), Yet, any 
adequate social system theo:cy deJnanjs the acknowledgment of the power of 
other members of the family system (the children) • 
If we aocept as a premise that children do have power in families, 
then we might also assume that chi.l.dren's power could be explaine:i by 
theoretical notions similar to those applied to marital power. scanzoni 
(1979) argued that there were four important issues that needed to be 
considered when attemptirg to expard theoretical models to encompass 
children's as well as parent's power. First, resources increase ani 
therefore power increases with the child's age. secoro, family :rules 
tern to prescribe subo:t'tiination of children's interests to these of their 
parents. 'lhird, there will tern to be greater conflict as Yam:J 
children's power grows ard their subordination is c:ontirrued. Foorth, 
coalitions will form between children against the parents or between a 
c:hild(ren) arx3. a parent against the other parent. 
'!he behavior of interest in this research was decision maki.n] 
within the family system, Tallman (1970) delineated an important 
distinction between problem sol vin:J ard decision makin;J. Pl:oblem sol virx] 
refers to behaviors which iniividuals or groups choose and implement in 
order to achieve desired erxls. Decision maJd.n;J, on the other hard, 
reflects a general p:ccx:ess of dete.rminin; actions whether or not outcome 
is assurOO. As a matter of fact, some families may devote inordinate 
amounts of energy to problems of internal oz:qanization am, theLefore, 
ren:ier themselves unable to mcbilize resow:ces to achieve other family 
ems. 
Met:hcxiological Issues 
Decision mak:in;r has most often been studied in small, ad hoc 
experimental groups. Structurally the family is a small group. 
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'lberefore, as far as structural variables are concerned, generalizations 
derived from small group research should be applicable to the family. 
Tallman (1970) noted that aey attempt to transfer principles from small 
group research to the study of families would require certain 
modifications am specifications. For example, the ad hoc experiment 
allows for the manipulation ani obseJ:vation of variables devoid of as 
many confOIJI'Xlin;J influences as possible. 'lh:is clearly creates unnatural 
situations am therefore attempts to transfer findings from such research 
to research with natural groups will require the reintroduction of those 
confoun:lin;J variables intrinsically linked with the group bein;J studied. 
It is desirable to examine the ran:Je, adequacy, am propriety of the 
research methods commonly employed to gather knowledge abc:Alt family power 
and. decision-mald.rq processes. Klein, Jorgensen, ani Miller (1978) fourxi 
sudl stock takin:j to he a hUlllblirg experience in that much of the extant 
l:eSeatth evidence was based upon inadequate or inappropriate 
methodological designs. However, they used this task as an opportunity 
to signal new directions that researchers might take in the future to 
impn:sve upon past efforts. 
IO.ein et al. (1978) identified two major approaches to the study of 
family interaction (i.e., the sur.rey am direct obsel:vations in a field, 
lal::matory, or clinical settin:;J). '!hey concluded that although survey 
techniques (the questi.onnail:e ani the inter.Tiew) have been used freely in 
the study of reciprocal intrafamily influences, their usefulness has 
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proven to be quite limited. 'Ibey conten:1ed that the study of reciprocal 
processes virtually c:iemarxis that family members be di.rectly obserled by 
the :researcher in a field or laboratory se~. Self reports by family 
members may be invalid because of the respondents' lack of awareness or 
.insensitivity to the nature of reciprocal causality in their day-to-day 
interactions. 'Ihe respon:lents' position in the family system may color 
their perceptions of the reciprocal nature of family interaction. Klein 
;;~:rxi his associates concluded that we can only infer reciprocal effects 
when usirg survey tecimiques. 
'Ihe direct obsel:vation method, accordi.rtj to Klein et al. (1978), was 
fc::P.mi to be more appropriate for observin;J the actual behavior of family 
members. 'nley also warned the family researcher of potential problems 
with the validity of direct observational methods, such as artificiality 
of settin;r, behavioral samplirg arxi c:cxli.ng difficulties, ani reactivity 
due to experimenter effects. Some of the advantages of the observatil.ll"lal 
method are these: (a) the method allows more direct contact with family 
members; (b) behavior arxi mutual effects are brought much closer to the 
im.:stigator's own sensory capabilities; am (c) a more empirically soun:i 
basis exists for drawin;J valid generalizations about reciprocal, dynamic 
interactions amon;;J family members. 
O'Rourke (1963) measured the decision-makirg behavior of three-
person family groups in their homes as well as umer laboratory 
c::o:rxii tions. He fc::P.mi that the balance between social-emotional ani 
instrumental behavior varies significantly as the place in which the 
interaction oo::urs am the sex of the child in the three-person group 
dl.aDJes. Both the quantity an:l quality of the gmJpS1 interactive 
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behavior C'l'larged as they moved from home to laboratory (i.e., the 
positivity of fathe:cs and children decreased as they moved from home to 
laboratoey while that of mothers increased). O'Rourke c::xm::::l.uded that 
families seen only in the laboratoey will experience more disagreement 
am~ members, will be more active l::Jut less efficient in decision-makirg 
and will register less emotionality than if they were obsel:ved. in their 
"natural" environments. Consequently, the laboratoey si'blation works a 
definite distortion, albeit varyin;J from group to group, on the 
experimental outcomes. '!his becomes a critical issue if generalization 
beyond the laboratoey situation is the object of the research. 
cromwell, I<lein, and Weitirq (1975) emphasized the importance of 
multitrait-multimethod analysis of family power relationships. 'lbe.y 
discussed the advantages of usin;J such observational tools as SIMFAM 
(straus & Tallman, 1971) and ''Reciprocity'' (Osmorxi, 1978) in the analysis 
of family interactional pattems. Both of these tools are social 
simulation games that were developed to study the dynamics of power 
relationships in the context of marriage ani the family. I<lein, 
Jorgensen, ani Miller (1978) c::ancluded: 
Viewin;J research designs as multidimensional ~ena. may permit us 
to seek out navel combinations of existin:;J methods or at least alert 
us to the sacrifices that must be made in any choice of method. (p. 
132) 
'lbe potential benefits of measur.in; multiple family members have 
been stressed. However, researchers world.ng with data sets from multiple 
family members struggle with serious problems, especially at the data 
analysis stage. Miller, :Rollins ani 'lhomas (1982) argued tllat many of 
the problems result from analyzin:] data comin::J from correlated measures. 
In data sets where two or more family members' responses are gathered, 
12 
does it follow that the dyad or the family then is the \mit of analysis? 
If so, resultant constraints drawn from the data will l:le important for 
problems of statistical test am inferences based on a given population. 
other important considerations must be made when usi.D:J multiple 
family members' responses. Notarius am Markman (1981) outlined three of 
these considerations. First, the nll.iability estimate must l:le comp.rt:ed 
on the same units of analysis that are used to test the hypotheses un:ier 
study. Secorxi, reliability must be e.stilllated on the data set that is a 
part of the study l:leiiq reported. AOO, finally, both an interobseJ:ver 
agreement imex am generalizability coefficients should l:le reported, as 
both give important information. 
'lheoretical Backgroi.Jni for Family Power Analysis 
Exc:ha.nqe 'lheory 
Much of the research on decision maki.nq in small groups has be.m 
gm.m:ied in social excharge theory. However, the transfer of this 
theoretical framework to the study of family decision maJti.n3" has been a 
relatively recent phenomer.on. 'lhibaut and Kelley (1959) proposed that a 
dyad ezy;Jaged in a mutually satisfyin;J relationship will exchan:]e 
behaviors that have low cost am high rewards to both members. Gottman 
et al. (1976) posited an altemative i.ntet'pretation of dyadic behavior in 
families. It was noted that a person will perceive a relationship as 
satisfy:in;J to the extent that he or she codes the behaviors received as 
positive. Also, the fact that we do not know a family member's 
comparison level for alternatives suggests a phenomenological method for 
measuriiq payoff. 'Iherefore, if one employs social exc:h.an.Je theory as a 
framework for analysis, then it might l:le necessary to design a 
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measurement procedUre to determine the positivity of the behavior 
received. c;attman et al. proposed that the behavior reoei.ved. would be 
coded directlY by the receiver (i.e., the family member). 
Coalition 'IheOIY 
coalition the:O:ey was the major theoretical framework for the present 
study. c;amson (1969) defined a coalition as the joint use of power by 
two or more units to control a decision. Coalitions not only influence 
outcomes in deCision maki.ng, but they also dramatically affect the 
distribution of power in arrt group. 'Ihere is an extensive mathematical, 
theoretical, ani empirical literature on coalitions. Coalition theory 
was initially developed to explain/predict the behavior of members of 
non-family small groups. 
'!be origins of the social psychological study of coalition formation 
may be foun:i in caplow (1956), who explicitly credits Simmel (1902a, 
1902b) as his inspiration. caplow's original theocy was an exterrled 
formulation of a general principle of Simmel's that in three-person 
grot:zps, t-o~To of the actors would form a coalition to the exclusion of the 
third. Also, central to caplow's theory was the idea that :people prefer 
to dominate rather than to be dominated. 
SUbseqUent J:eSearChes have focused on the related issues of 
predicting which coalitions wlll form ani how members of coalitions will 
distril:JUte the gains from coalitions. Although research fin::i:in:Js have 
often SlJRXlrted hypOtheses conc::em:in:] the importance of coalitions in 
determini.D1 t.he ultimate distribution of decision-makin;J power, the 
effects of coalitions have been almost entirely igoored in dj scussions of 
power in families. 
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Historically, coalition theory conside:.t:ed resources as most 
influential in the development of coalitions (i.e., persons weak in 
resources form coalitions against the person st.rorqest in resources). 
Recently, coalition theorists have identified other critical variables. 
For example, when two inii.vidua.ls belon;J to the same family or fraternity 
or are of the same sex, they are more likely to form coalitions than are 
individuals who are not. 'Ihe effect of these variables may, in fact, be 
stron;er than the effect of resources that imividuals possess. How do 
we explain the st.ren;;t:h of these non-resource variables? COUld their 
~be related to such issues as continuity arx'!for commitlnent? 
Empirical tests of the effects of non-resource variables have led to 
mixed :results. For example, Miller (1981) studied the relative effects 
of likin;J ani resources on coalition formation in triads. ''Liking'' had a 
significant effect on the formation of coalitions, as le>n:1 as there were 
no differen::es in resources amon:J the triad members; but when there were 
differences in resow:ces, the effect of liki.rq was overwhelmed. Of 
course, in Miller's study, li.lti.rq was experimentally manipulated. How 
might the results have been modified had the researcher studied family 
members who had previously identified their preferences or "likin:t' for 
certain other family members? One possible hypothesis is that lildn;J 
would exert a strorger influence relative to resow:ces. If 1~ is 
operationally defined as interpersonal attraction, how then might it be 
measured in fa:milies? Arxl, furthermore, is lik:i..n; a necessary but not 
sufficient con:lition for enteri.rg a coalition with another family 
membe.r(s)? Conversely, are there certain corditions urXler which it is 
politically expedient to form a coalition with disliked family members? 
l5 
'lbeory ani :research in coalition formation suggest that coalition 
outcomes may deperd on the participants' prior bazgainin;J experierv:::es. 
However, the results of many coalition e>q;eriments may be restricted to 
naive bargainers am may not be generalized to experiezv:::ed, sophisticated 
bargainers. Komorita and Kravitz (1981) irwestigated the effects of 
prior experience on coalition bal:gainirg. '!he results of that study 
clearly demonstrated that familiarity ani prior experiezx:e with coalition 
games markedly affect the payoff distributions of the coalition members. 
Paradoxically, prior experience had negligible effects on the frequencies 
of various possible coalitions. 
'!here is little question as to whether the issue of prior experience 
is critical in examinations of family bazgainin;J precesses. Family 
members have a history of barga.inirg experience with each other which 
they brlrxj with them to the experimental situation. '!he family also has 
expectations for future barga.inirg encounters which are shaped by 
previous am cun:ent baJ:gai.nin;J experiences ani which influence current 
bargainin;J behavior. For example, a family member might select a 
coalition parbler(s) based on loyalties to certain family members derived 
from earlier successful coalition outcomes. on the other han:i, a current 
coalition partner(s) might be selected because of an anticipated need in 
the future for which the person(s) might be partiallarly useful. 'Dnls, 
coalitions in families are continuous a."Xi involve loyalty arxi commitment. 
At the same time, coalitions are clynamic and ad hoc as the balance of 
power shifts with intexnal ani extenla1 influences impac:ti.rq the family. 
Q:)alition theory provides a useful conceptual tool for analyzi.rq the 
ways in which power relationships are balanced in families t.hralgh the 
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contirrual shiftin; of alliances between family members. Blood (1972) 
cont:erx:ied that coalitions develop in the family for the p.u:pose of 
eD:Ja,gin;J in conflict, for solidarity, or to maximize rewards for 
participatin:J members. Parental behavior may provoke siblin;J coalitions. 
Coalitions may develop across age ani sex l:lolln:3aries within the siblin;J 
subsystem or between a siblirg ani a parent. Coalitions in some families 
demani loyalty ani rewards thus affectin;J a fair use of power in the 
family system. On the other harrl, coalitions help family members adapt 
to the needs aiXi frustrations of living together in the same system. 
Coalitions can ani do take many ani varied forms within a given 
family. Galvin aiXi Brommel (1982) outlined some of the typical 
coalitions that develop in families. Parents often form a coalition 
against the children thus preventin;J negotiation or dismssion. EXten:le:i 
family ani friems can become part of a power bloc. Unusual power 
coalitions may develop in single-parent families due to the presence of 
one adult. Blen:ied families must contem with children playi.n] one side 
of the family against the other. Also, some coalitions continue over 
time, while others develop only for reachirx] a decision on a given issue. 
caplow (1968) foun:i that s:iblin;J coalitions of same-sex siblin;r.; were 
most common ani that age differences in siblin;J coalitions were small. 
He axgued that coalitions between s:iblirgs may be fostered due to the 
lcm;Je age rarge that exists in the family system. 
Formal models of coalition formation have centered on two major 
issues. '!he first issue relates to coalition choice (i.e., how persons 
in competitive situations choose between alternative coalitions). '!he 
second issue deals with the mobilization of revolutionary coalitions in 
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cooperative group settings. It is the secoiXl of these two issues that 
seems to have the greatest implications for family group research. 
Coalitions between siblings may be fostered due to the large 
variation in age that exists amen;; family members. Parents are much 
older than their children an:i have more e>Q?erience, resources, an:i power 
to dominate the group. It is not sw:prisin;J to fim that siblings 
coalesce to wield authority against other sibling coalitions as well as 
to counteract the impact of parents. 
caplow (1968) outlined the following possibilities for the formation 
of coalitions in the various family subsystems as follows: 
When the parental coalition is so solidary that no child is ever 
allowed to form a winning coalition with one parent against the 
other, we may expect to see st:ron;J coalitions amorx.:J the children and 
even a corxii.tion of general solidarity unitin;J all the children of a 
large family. When one parent is clearly dominant, a conservative 
coalition is likely to form between the weaker parent an:i a child, 
which may lead in turn to the formation of sibling coalitions 
against the favorite child or to other very complicated patterns in 
a sizable family. When father and mother are nearly equal in power 
but do not have a strong parental coalition, sibling rivalry will be 
intense ani bitter as the children compete among themselves for tile 
shiftin;J coalition opportunities offered by their parents. (p. 99) 
Propositions such as these help to clarify potentiality for rivalry in 
the nature of the interaction that occurs in a family. Coalitions among 
an:i between family members can have both an integrative ani a disnlptive 
effect on family functioning. Although a given coalition may predominate 
on the basis of some balance of power an:i likeness, other coalitions will 
appear in response to other situations. '1hl.s alternation of coalitions, 
according to caplow, accounts for much of the vitality of family life ani 
may contribute to the cohesiveness of the total family by preventing any 
sin;Jle coalition from becoming too divisive. Obviously, it is also a 
18 
scuroe of perennial instability an::l tension. 
History of Family Interaction ani Power Ola:q;Je 
Galvin am Brommel (1982) conterxl that families a:re unique decision-
makin::.J systems because the family has a histoey of havin;J ~lved or not 
hav.irq resolved past issues effectively. Past successes am failures can 
either enhance or impede current decision makin;J. Decision mak.in;J 
relates to power to the extent that one family member can predict an:Jior 
influence desired outcomes. '!he family differs from a non-family small 
group that comes together for a task by virtue of its histoey of 
continuous interaction arrl its composition of intemeperrlent imi.viduals. 
However, most of the early research studies on coalition formation 
limited these factors :by workin] with non-family groups which had not had 
the opportunity to form sociometric sub;Jroups. 
Parent-child power relationships, as they apply to family decision-
mak.in;J an::l problem solvin;J, have been studied by a number of researchers 
(Ferreira, 1963: Fen:ei.ra & Winter, 1965: Tallman, 1970). Tallman (1970) 
considered the flexibility of the power structure as a critical factor 
influencin;J the decision-makin;J an::l problem-sol vin;r precesses. He argued 
that the optimum structure would be one which becomes more open CNer the 
life cycle. Bath Ferreira (1963) ani later Ferreira ani Winter (1965) 
found that the amount of agreement amen; family members on seemin:;ly 
unimportant matters, prior to aey i.nt.erd'lan;Je, was not only greater than 
chance, but capable of differentiati.nq normal from abnormal families. 
'lhe researchers speculated that this f:i.n:iin;r reflected the fact that 
family members have lived together for many years, as a gro.Ip, un:ier 
corxiitions of c:cmtant intet'chan;Je of information about, am 
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acx:ommodation to, their respective likes am dislikes. 
'!be balance of power in families has been identified as a sh.iftin:J 
~enon J:Jy several researchers. Edwards am Brauburqer (1973) noted 
that this shift is particularly evident at the stage of adolescence. It 
is at this time that the power begins to shift in fcwor of the child, for 
durin; adolescence peer group :rewards take on crucial significance am 
parental approval concomitantly declines in importance. 'lhe pa:rent-child 
relationship can evolve at this point in one of two directions-that in 
which coercion is applied to brin;J about the desired compliance, or that 
in which expansion of the exchan:;Je system takes place. Hoffman (1963) 
cont:en:ied that authoritarian strategies will prevail if the parent 
identifies with hisjher high power role am hisjher defensiveness against 
daJbt is sll:on;. However, there are likely to be mo:re contested issues 
between parents arxl adolescents with a concomitant breakirY;J down of the 
excharY;Je system aooompanied l:Jy conflict. 
Coalition <llange am Measurement 
Bonacich, Grusky am Peyrot (1981) derived status maintenance theory 
as an attempt to adapt caplow's model to the family system. status 
maintenance theoey is based on the assumption that family members act so 
as to maintain the intergity of the family arxi its distrlliution of 
legitimate authority. '!be central principle is that two mutually 
exclusive coalitions will not form because in conflict situations other 
family members will side with the family member of higher rank. 'Ihis is 
different from caplow's model, in which only the top-rank:in:;J group member 
is assumed to prefer a system-~ coalition; other 9m.1P members 
a:re not :reluctant to form winnin;J revolutionary coalitions. 'lbe 
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assumption of a hierarchical power chain with F>M>O>Y still prevails with 
system maintenance theory. 
If we view the family as an organization, then we can assume that 
the family has an interest in avoi.din;J :revolutiona.ty coalitions because 
they subvert the orqanizational hierarchy. Parents are the leaders in 
this organizati~l hierarchy, arxi the s:ihlin;Js are the subordinates. 
Parents may offer in:iucements to some, but not all, subontinates in order 
to prevent a subordinate revolt. What are some of the common forms of 
imucements afforded target siblin;;Js by the parents? In1ucements may 
take the form of special privileges (e.g., late curfew hoors, larger 
allowances, or supeiVisory responsibilities over other s:ihlin;s) • :&lt how 
do these irducements operate to prevent the development of coalitions? 
lawler, Youn;JS an:i I.esh (1978) empirically investigated cxx:Jptation 
arxi coalition mobilization in non-family small groups. 'lbeir data 
supported an interest-weakenin;J interpretation an:i suggested that the 
response of the target was the major basis for cooptation success. 'Ihe 
target expected more personal gain from the .irxiucement arxi prevented the 
coalition by makin;J anti-coalition pl:tlpOSals and pe.rsuac:ting the nontaJ:get 
to accept his view. Coc::ptation strategy proved most effective if the 
offer made by the leader conveyed a strorl;J commitment to follow through 
an the inducement and if the in:iuoement reflecte::l the choice or 
discretion of the leader rather than situational constraints. 
Iawler and 'lbompson (1979) examined the issue of subordinate 
response to a leader's cooptation strategy. 'Iheir results supported the 
notion, based on 'lhibaut ani Kelley's (1959) treatment of usable power, 
(i.e., subordinates will be more inclined to mobilize a coalition when 
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they can control the coalition's effect on their own outcomes or the 
leader's outcomes). 'Ihis utilitarian framework :i.rrlicates that targets 
will be more inclined to mobilize an insw:gent coalition the greater the 
expected utility of a coalition am the lower the expected utility of the 
in::lucement. '!he ability to deflect an iniucement offer from a parent may 
be influerx:ed by the s:ilili.n;'s resources such as age, sex and self-
esteem. 'lbese so-called status variables may contribute to the sllilin;J's 
belief that he or she can control the outcome of a decision-making 
process through a s:ililin;J coalition. 
Predictions about Coalitions from the Literature 
Siblin;J coalitions are more likely to form under con:iitions of 
perceived or real inequity from parents aooorciin; to caplow (1968). He 
argued that if the parental coalition is so st:ron;J that parent-child 
winnirg coalitions are never allowed, then stron;J siblin;;J coalitions are 
likely to occur. Coalitions are more likely to form between siblirq.; who 
are of more equal status an::l who will staid to benefit equally from the 
coalition. 'Iherefore, s:ilili.n; coalitions are more likely to form between 
same-sex s:ililin]s with small age differences. On the other han:i, siblin;J 
coalitions are less likely to form in families when parents are equal in 
power but do not have a stJ:cng parental coalition. '!he latter situation 
results in intense rivalries for potential parent-child coalitions. 
caplow (1968) predicted that cxmflict is likely to occur in families 
in which the children's power increases (by virtue of their i.ncreasirg 
age and maturity level) with no concomitant decrease in subordination of 
children's interests to those of their parents. 'nle types of coalitions 
that emerge urder such ccmitions may be influerced by family 
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environmental factors such as expressiveness (i.e., the extent to which 
family members are allowed ani encourage:i to act openly ani to express 
their feelin:js directly), organizational structure (i.e., the degree of 
explicitness ani clarity regardin:] family rules ani responsibilities), 
ani control (i.e., the extent to which the family is organized in a 
hierarchical manner am the rigidity of family rules arxl procedures). 
Collins ani Raven (1969) predicted that siblirgs have a greater 
likelihood of combi.nin; their resources against a common foe when the 
opportunity arises as a result of some factors inherent in the sibling 
subsystem itself. Sibli.n;s spend more time with each other (e.g., 
talkin:;J, sharing liv~ arran;Jements an::l household chores), they share 
common interests, am they are of relatively equal status vis-a-vis their 
parents. 'lbese factors increase the likelihcxxi of coalitions developirg 
within the siblin; subsystem. 
For the present research, these predictions were state:i in the form 
of hypotheses which were tested in a laboratory experiment. '!be 
description of the experiment, the data analysis, am the results are 
presented in the followin:] chapters. 
aiAPl'ER II 
MEIHOOOI.OOY 
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'Ibis study used two theories of coalition formation that seemed 
particulaey useful in generatin:;J hypotheses about coalitions in families. 
Since no valid or reliable measure of frunily coalitions had been 
developed, a major objective of this research was to include several 
~to detennine the inte.mal validity of the investigation. 
One theory used was Caplow's (1968) theory in which he developed a 
set of untested hypotheses about coalitions in families by modifyin;r his 
earlier theory of coalitions in triads (Caplow, 1956) to make it 
applicable to ooalitions in organizational hierarchies. 'lbe secorxi 
theoey was that of Bonacich, Gl:usky am Peyrot (1981). '!bey develope?. a 
"status maintenance theory," which was i.ntenied to describe coalition 
pattems in highly legitimate power hierarchies (such as the family). To 
test hypotheses from these theories, this study investigated the types of 
coalitions an:i the con:iitions unier which they develop in nomal 
(nonclinical) family groups. 
Hypotheses 
'!he hypotheses to be tested in this stu:iy were based on two 
different coalition theories. caplow's (1968) theoey of coalitions in 
families ard Bcnaciach, Grusky am l?eyrot's (1981) modification of 
caplow's theory of coalitions in triads provided the theo:retical 
umerp~ for this study. 
caplow distirquished between three types of two-against-one 
coalitions in triads. In the ~ (where A > B > C) triad the BC 
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coalition which sucreeds in overc::omin;r A, the most :powerful, is a 
"revolutionary'' coalition. A revolutionaxy coalition subverts the 
organizational power strllCture by :reducin;J the most powerful to the least 
powerful. A 11consetVative" coalition is one that does not reorder power 
in the triad. 'Ibe AB coalition is conservative because if it forms A is 
still the most powerful arxi c the least. "Improper'' coalitions are those 
which are neither revolutionary nor conservative. If the improper AC 
coalition were to form, the position of B relative to c would be 
subverted. caplow posited that organizations have an interest in 
avoidin; revolutionary am improper coalitions because they subvert the 
organizational hierarchy. SUperior members of an organization prefer 
conservative to improper coalitions as they preser.re the integrity of the 
hierarchy from which they benefit. 
caplow (1968) assumed that the family consists of a hierarchical 
power chain composed of Father as most powerful followed by Mother, Older 
Child, am Y~er Child. caplow•s stated prediction was, therefore, 
that the coalition structure in the family would be either Father-Mother 
vs. Older Olil.d-YOlll'qer Child (two conservative coalitions) or Mother-
Older Orlld vs. Father-YO\.lllger Child (a revolutionaey arxi an improper 
coalition). caplow•s theo::ey generated several testable hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: In a family with a strorq parental coalition, there is a 
greater likelihood that chlldren will develop stronger 
siblin;r coalitions than parent-chll.d coalitions. 
Hypothesis 2: In a family with one clearly dominant parent, there is a 
greater likelihood that the weaker parent will develop a 
st.ron;Jer coalition with the older child than with the 
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other parent or the yourger child. 
Hypothesis 3: In a family with two nearly equal parents who do not have 
a st:ronq parental coalition, there is a greater 
likelihood that st.ron:Jer parent-child coalitions than 
child-child coalitions will develop. 
Hypothesis 4: stJ:orger siblin;J coalitions are more likely to form 
between same-sex siblin;Js than between q:posite-sex 
siblir¥3s. 
Hypothesis 5: stron;;er siblin;J coalitions are more likely to form 
between sibli!gs who are closer as q:posed to more 
distant in age. 
Bonacich, Gl:Usky ani Peyrot (1981) developed "statl.ls maintenance 
theory'' in an attempt to adapt caplow's (1968) model to the family 
system. Drawirg f:rom Parsons arxi Bales (1955), Bonacich et al. noted 
that one clistinct.ive feature of the family as a small social system is 
its division into two subsystems (i.e., parents arxi children). 'Ihey 
argued that the maintenance of the division between these 'tWO statuses is 
a prerequisite for normal family f'Unctionin;r. Parental authority must be 
maintained in older to implement socialization of the children 
effectively am to discharge the responsibility for pro~~idin;J am 
maintainin;J resources. status maintenance theocy is based on the 
assumption that family members act so as to maintain the integrity of the 
family am its distribution of "legitimate" authority. 'lbe central 
principle is that two mutually exclusive coalitions will not form, 
because in acy d.isime other family members will side with the family 
member of higher rank. If the third family member is not of lower status 
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than both disputants the result will be a conservative coalition (e.q., 
father supports mother against a child). If the intetvener is of lower 
status than bath disputants, then an improper coalition will have formed 
(e.q., the }701.11l;er child sidi.n:] with the father against the older child). 
Revolutionaey coalitions should not form. 'lhis is quite different from 
caplow's (1968) model, in which only the top-rankin:J group member is 
asswned to have a preference for consetVative coalitions while other 
groop members are not reluctant to form w~ revolutionacy coalitions. 
'lherefore, the followi.B;J hypothesis was made. 
Hypothesis 6: Family members will qive strorrJer support to the higher 
status family member in the decision-makirq task. 
sanple 
'Ihis study was part of a larqer project on :normal (:nonclinical) 
family interaction. However, this resean::her participated in all parts 
of the samplin;J ani data collection for the l~er project. Resporxients 
for the larger study were 62 two-parent, intact families with at least 
one child between five and twelve years of aqe, while this study exam:ined 
a subset of 24 families. If the parents were divorced ani remarried, at 
least one child had to be a result of the remarriage an:i fall within this 
aqe rarge. Since nonclinical family interaction was beirr;J investigated, 
no family members OCA.ll.d be in psychiatric treatment at the time of the 
study. 
A replicated systematic ramom sample was drawn from two elementary 
schools (grades K-6), one each from Wake ani nn:ham counties in central 
North carolina. '!be two schools were selected from the respective 
counties based on a size large enolJ3h to provide an adequate samplin:;J 
frame, an:i because they were the most representative of the overall 
demographic characteristics of the respective counties. 
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student lists were acquired from the Director of Research from each 
COlD'lty school system. 'lhese lists included all students attemin;J school 
durin;J the academic year 1984-1985. Since no information rega.rciin;J 
marital status was included on the lists, there was no absolute certainty 
regardin;J the number of families meetin:;J the eligibility criterion of 
two-parent famlly. In an attempt to rule out as many ineligibles as 
possible from the target population, students whose last names clearly 
did not match with the names of their designated parentjguantian were 
eliminated. Students identified as haniica~ am requi.rin;J special 
education ser.rices were excluded from the lists as they did not meet the 
identified criterion for normal families. students were excluda:l from 
the lists if their birth date reflected the fact that they were already 
13 years old. All other students were considered eligjl:)le unless they 
failed to meet the age restrictions at the time of t:e.stin;. 
'!be replicated systematic ran:lom sample was drawn to assure that 
proportional representation across grade levels was included in the 
sample. To be assured that each. family had an equal chance of bein;J 
drawn in the sample, the separate lists were ordered alphabetically am 
blocked accorc:iin:J to grade with families included who had only one child 
in a sin;le grade. Families with two or more children in the schools 
were otdered only alphabetically and merged with the first lists. 
Mailin:;s describi!g the study were sent to potentially eligible 
families. Letters were sent to 235 families in the D.u:ha:m COUnty school 
ani 510 families in the Wake County school. Follow-up tele];:hone calls 
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wem made to 362 families in Wake CoUnty resultin;J in 260 contacts. 
Tel~ follow-up calls were made to 123 families in DlU:ham ca.mty 
result.in;J in 103 contacts. All families contacted had the opportunity to 
participate, if they so desired. Sixty-two families ultimately 
participated in the larger study. Of these 62 families, 34 families were 
from Wake county ani 28 families were from DuJ::ham Co.mty. A total of 98 
families of the 260 contacted in Wake County were not eligible because of 
failure to meet the criteria for inclusion. In OJrtlam Crunty, 18 
families of the 103 contacted were not eligible for inclusion. 
'lherefore, the response rate for Wake County was 21% am 33% for D.lrllam 
eoonty. '1he other 185 families contacted were either 'UI'lable or unwilli.rx;1 
to participate. Olaracteristics of the 62 families seem to be 
representative of all elig:ilile families. 
'Ihe final sample size for this study was 24, which was a subset of 
families selected from the replicated systematic rarx3om sample. To have 
been included in this subset, a family must have had only two children, 
one child between five an::l twelve years of age arxl a seoord child between 
five and eighteen years of age. '1he decision to examine only families 
with two children was made to simplify the statistical analyses ard for 
ease of comparison with other studies (in particular, Bonacich, Gl:Usk.y & 
Peymt, 1981). '1he sample size was originally intended to have been 30 
families, :rut only 24 families met the eligibility requirements. 
Cbaracteristics of the sample for this study are liste:i in Table 1. 
'1he full sample of 62 families ani their characteristics are reported in 
Appendix A. Examination of this information revealed that men am women 
in the fllll sample were awroxfmately one year ~ than these in the 
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Table 1 
Sample Cl\aracteristics of Parents am chlldren 
PARENTS 
Men (N=24) 
Cl'laracteristic MEAN SD Ran;je 
Age 39.7 5.0 31-50 
Fducation 16.0 .9 12-22 
Income 32-34 13-50+ 
(ran:Je in (median) 
t.hcusaros) 
Years Married 18 11-22 
(m:dian) 
Hours Worked 48.6 10.4 38-80 
Per Week 
Race 
Black 25.0% 
White 70.8% 
other 4.2% 
COUnty of Residence 
rurham 
Wake 
Times Married 
One 
Two 
Qlaracteristic 
Aqe 
sex 
Male 
Female 
13% 
11% 
100% 
C3-Youn;er Child(N=24) 
MFAN SD Rarqe 
8.2 
37.5% 
62.5% 
2.4 5-12 
Women (N=24) 
MFAN SD Ran:Je 
37.7 4.1 29-45 
14.5 .a 12-18 
14-16 0-37 
(median) 
18 11-22 
(median) 
37.2 9.5 10-50 
25.0% 
70.8% 
4.2% 
13% 
11% 
100% 
C4-older Child(N=24) 
MFAN SD Ran:]e 
12.0 
62.5% 
37.5% 
2.9 6-17 
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subset sample studied. 'lhe education am individual i.rx::ome levels 
iniicated a predominantly middle-class sample. Both education ani 
iniividual incx:>me levels were higher in the subset sample of 24 families 
am higher than the national average in the subf'et ani the full sample. 
'lhe respcments were predominantly white (74.2% full sample, 70.8% subset 
sample) am from uman counties. Most of the :responients were in their 
first marriages am the median number of years married was 16 in the full 
sample arxi 18 in the subset sample. 'Ihe len;Jth of marriage varied in the 
subset (11 to 22 years) am in the full sample (9 to 23 years). All men 
ani women were employed outside the home arxl on average worked full time. 
'!he number of children in all families varied from 1 to 5 in the larger 
sample ani was constant at two in the subset sample. In this study, the 
youn;Jer child was typically female (62.5%) with an average age of 8.2 
years. '!be older child was typically male (62.5%) with an average age of 
12.0 years. Age ani sex characteristics of the children in the total 
sample are :reportOO. in Apperxtix A. 
ll:ita Collection P:roc:edures 
Potentially eligible families, who were selected from the replicated 
systematic ran:lom sample from the two elementary school lists, were 
contacted by letter (see Apperxtix B) am then by telephone to disalSS the 
nature of the study, to determine eligibility for participation in the 
study, ani to invite them to participate in the study. Families who 
agreed to participate were sc.'l'l.edul.ed for a two-hour research session at 
one of two sites. Wake county subjects were seen at Wake Teen Medical 
Seivices video lab ani Imham county subjects were seen at North carolina 
Memorial Hospital, Cbapel Hill. 
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All telephone contacts were made by the researcher (male) ani a 
:research assistant (female graduate student). Fa.1r attempts were made to 
contact a family on different days and at different times before 
considerirr;J them unavailable. Also, families were queried about their 
reasons for not participat.in;J in the study, when that was their decision. 
Fach participati.n:J family received a letter (see Appen:lix C) 
subsequent to the tel~ contact confirm~ the appointment time ard 
location. In addition to the letter, several of the parental inventories 
were included with a request to fill them out arxi br~ them to the 
session. 'lhi.s was done to reduce the time required to oomplete a testing 
protocol. All testi.rg sessions were scheduled in the evenin:]s ani on 
weekeros to accommodate family schedules. All family members were 
invited to participate. A remin:ler telephone contact was made 24 hem's 
prior to the scheduled appointment time to confirm or to reschedule the 
appointment if necessary. 
TWo interviewers were present for eaC'h session, as irxiepeOOent 
testirq of parents am C'hildren was required. one of the co-principal 
investigators of the larger study was present at each session. One 
graduate student research assistant was also present at each session. 
'!he ooml::linations of sex of experimenters was not controlled in aey 
systematic manner. Two graduate student research assistants were hired 
for eaC'h of the testin;1 sites. Research assistants were trained on the 
use of the videotapixq equipment an:i on the administration of all 
inventories an:i interview protocols. 'lbe research assistants were paid 
six dollars ($6.00) per hour for their time. 'lhe first family was seen 
on October 15, 1985 an:i the last family was seen on JarnllUY 11, 1987. 
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Upon arrival at the research session, the puipOSe of the study was 
explained again to the whole family. Signed consent was obtained from 
all family members, except.in;J only those children who were unable to sign 
their names (see Apperdix D). A small sum of money ($10.00 per family) 
was given to families in exc:han;le for their time. A full description of 
the step-by-step plan of events for the testin; session was provided to 
each family. An introduction to the videotapirq equipment was made to 
reduce anxieties related to bei.rg filmed. Confidentiality of all test 
results am the intended use of the results were dj SOJSsed with the 
family. 
'!he family was then videotaped while ergaged in the 30-minute 
experiment. 'lhe first 20 minutes involved play tasks. '!be play 
interaction consisted of one lo-minute segment of play, whereby the 
family was directed to build anyt:l1.inJ they chose with Lego blocks. 'lbe 
secon:i lo-mirute segment of play focused arourd a competitive board game 
(i.e., Chinese Checkers). '!he video camera was tumed off after the 
secon:i 10-minute segment in order that the families could be instructed 
about the decision-maki.n;J task. 'lbese first two 1o-minute segments were 
germane to the foalS of the latger project on normal family interactions, 
but they were only tan:Jentially related to the foalS of the present 
study. 
Experimental Decision-mald.ry Task 
'Ihe final 1o-minute segment of videotaped family interaction 
entailed a st:J:uctured decision-mald.n; task. '!be decision-makin:J task was 
designed by the researcher to create a conflict situation for the family. 
A pilot investigation with three families was comuc:ted to assure that 
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the task did in fact create a conflict situation ani did in fact 
stimulate the formation of coalitions between an:i amorg family members. 
'!be followin;r explanation ani instructions were provided to each family 
by the experimenter: 
We would like to urxlerstan:i more about the processes by which 
families make decisions regard.j.n; important issues in their daily lives. 
In order for us to learn more about these processes, we would like for 
you to play a decision-maki.rg game for the next 10 mirn.rtes. Preten:i, for 
a moment, that I (experimenter] had $100.00 which I c::oul.d give to you ani 
your family to do with as you please. 'lhe only thin;J is that all of you 
would have to decide together how your family would use the $100.00. You 
am your family could do anything you wanted to with the money. You 
could use it for fun activities or you could use it to pay for something 
your family wants or needs. Your family could choose to use it together 
or choose to divide it. For the next 10 minutes, please discuss ani make 
a decision about how you would use the $100.00. I will let you know when 
5 minutes, a minutes, ani 9 minutes have gone by. I will stop you at the 
en::l of the 10 minutes. We will be videotapin; you as you play this game. 
Before you begin, please take a few mirn.rtes to answer the three questions 
on the sheet of paper I am han::tin:] to you now (see Appemix E). After 
the game, I will give you another sheet of paper on which there are five 
questions related to your experiences durirg the game (see Appen:lix F). 
Please take a few minutes to answer these five questions carefully. Are 
there any questions? You may begin now. 
Pre-experilrental Questionnaire 
'lhe pre-experimental decision-makin; game questionnaire, referred to 
in the directions given to the families (see AppeD:tix E), was 
administered prior to the videotapin;r of the 10-minute decision-mak.in; 
game. 'lhis questionnaire included three questions ard was completed by 
each family member in::ieperxiently. One question was designed to have the 
iniividual consider hisjher personal preference for how the family would 
use the $100.00 in order for each person to be clear about expectations 
regardirxJ outcome before the videotaping began. A sec:oni question was 
designed to have the irxiividual think about potential coalition partners 
.in the family in order to measure each member's notion of typical teams. 
'nle third question was designed to obtain information about family 
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members' perceptions of whom they believed would be most powerful in the 
family decision-makin;J game. All questionnaires were collected an:l the 
videotapi.rg of the decision-maki.rq game was initiated. 
Post-experimental Questionnaire 
At the ern of 10 minutes, the families were instructed to stop the 
game whether a decision had been reached or not. 'Ibe video camera was 
turned off at this point. All family members then completed the post-
experimental decision-makin;J game questionnaire referred to in the 
directions given to the families (see Apperilix F). '!he questionnaire 
included five questions arxi was completed by each family member 
irriepen:lent.Jy. One question was designed to have family members identify 
the coalitions that they observed durin; the decision-makin;;J game. 
Another question asked if the coalitions observed durin;J the decision-
maki.rg game were the typical coalitions that occur in their family 
decisionirq. A third question asked if characteristic family behaviors 
emerged in the decision-makin;J game. 'IWo questions were designed to 
identify family members' attitudes about their levels of satisfaction ani 
feelin;Js of faimess al:lout the outcome of the decision-~ game. 
Psychological Inventories 
After all family members completed the post-experimental decision-
mald.n;; game questionnaire, the family was given a short break. 'lben the 
parents ani children were separated for the next ];Xlase of the session. 
'Ihey went into different rooms acx::ompanied by one of the intaviewers. 
All children eight years old ani older completed the arlldren's 
Report of Parental Behavior InVentol:y (CRPBI) Revised Version by 
Schludermam arx1 Schludermann (1970) on both parents. '1he self 
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Cilservation scales (SOS), • a measure of self-esteem developed by stenner 
ani Katzenmeyer (1979), were completed by children 5 years old ani older. 
Either the Family Environrrt.tant Scale (FES) by Moos, Insel arxi Humphrey 
(1974), designed for children 10 years old and older, or '!be Chlldren's 
Version of the Family :Environment Schale (CVFES) by Pino, Simons an:i 
Slawinowski (1984) , designed for children 6 to 10 years old, was 
completed by all children. Permission to request information from each 
child's school was secured from the parents. 
Parents completed the Parent Report of Chlld Behavior to the Parent 
(Scllaefer & Edgerton, 1975), the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) by 
Derogatis (1975), and the Eybel:g Chlld Behavior Inventory (ECBI) by 
Eyberg ani~ (1978) on all dri.l.dren. '1bey also completed the Family 
ElWU:onment Sch.ale (FFS) by Moos, Insel an:i Humphrey (1974). In a brief 
semistructured interview with the parents, demographic information an1 
information about family decision-m~ pa'tt:el:rl..s was obtained (see 
Appeixlix G). 'Ihe Dyadic Adjustment Scale (Spanier, 1976) ani the Life 
EXperiences survey (Sara.son, Johnson & Siegel, 1978) were completed by 
bath parents. All st.amardized i.nstniments were used only in the larqer 
study. 
Measures of Coalitions 
COalition Definition 
In this study, the depement variable was the coalition. A 
coalition was defined as exi.9tin1 when family members jointly used their 
~to control a decision. Coalitions are not synonymous with 
affective cliques of mutual attraction nor are they indicated by the 
absen:le of di.sp.Ites amtn3' family members. For the pJilXISe of this study, 
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coalitions were measured as a proportion (i.e., the frequency of 
supportive statements made by two family members to each other compared 
to the total numl::ler of supportive statments made by all family members 
dur.in;J the eJCperimental decision-makin:] task) (Eonacich, Grusky & Peyrot, 
1981). A sup[X)rtive statement or action must be manifested by one family 
member toward the position of another family member in a conflictual 
family situation in order for an observer to identify the presence of a 
coalition. 
An example from the transcript of a test family session usizl1 the 
researcher designed experimental task will help clarify the definition of 
a coalition. In the Jones family, Mother suggested that the money be 
USEd to go to an amusement park arxi for havizl1 dinner. In response to 
Mother's suggestion, Father said ''Yeah, we could eat am buy the food at 
the amusement park." SUpport was also provided to Mother by Older Child 
who said, "And then we can ride the roller coaster three times in the 
fl:ont seat." At this point in the discussion, two coalitions can be 
identified. Mother arxi Father have en;aged in one coalition am Mother 
arxi Older Chlld have formed a coalition aroun:i the issue of how a certain 
amount of money ($100.00) will be used by the family. 'nle YOUD;Jer Child 
in this family then proposed an alternative option, ''let's each get $5.00 
ani the remainin;J $5.00 could l:le spent on sugar-ft:ee b.lbble gmn." 'lhere 
was no support 'at other family members for YOUD;Jer Child's suggestion, 
thus keepirg' intact the Father->Mother and the Older Chlld->Mother 
coalitions for the moment. 
'IypeS of Coalitions 
'!he followin;J symbols were used in order to simplify the 
presentation of family data: 
F = Father 
M =Mother 
C4 =Older Child 
C3 = Younger Child 
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There are six possible coalition types in a family of four. 'Ihe 
coalition types were F<->M, F<->C3, F<->C4, M<->C3, M<->C4, ani C3<->C4. 
1. Parent-parent coalitions (PAR) were composed of the proportion 
of the total number of sup-portive statements made by the family 
which were made by F->M + M->F. 
2. Parent-child coalitions (PC) were computed by a.ddi.m the number 
of F->C4 + C4->F + F->C3 + C3->F + M->C4 + C4->M + 
M->C3 + C3->M supportive statements arxi divid.in; that sum by 
the total number of supportive statements made by the family. 
3. Siblirq Coalitions or child-child coalitions (SIB) were composed 
of the proportion of the totall'lUlllber of supportive statements 
made by the family which were made by C4->C3 + C3->C4. 
COdinq Method 
'1he coding method involved several steps that were followed in 
sequence by the researcher (see Apperdix H for Coc:lin3' Manual arrl Rat~ 
Form). 'lbe researcher viewed the total 10-minute videotape segment to 
become familiar with the family. D.lrirxj this first viewin;J the 
:researc:her looked for the presentation of ideas by family members. 'Ihe 
researcher recorded each family member's idea for the decision-makirg 
38 
task on the ratil'q form. If a family member chan;ed or modified hisjher 
idea durin; the 10-minut:e segment, the researcher recorded each idea 
he/she presented. 'I!le family's final decision ani the originator of the 
idea were :reooJ:ded on the ratin:J form. 
'1he researcher viewed the entire 10-minute videotape segment throUgh 
a seconi time. '1hi.s time the researcher recorded the suwortive acts 
obseived duril'q the 10-minute decision-maki.n;r task by placi.n; a slash 
mark in the appropriate box on the ratil'q form. Instnlctions ani 
descriptors of supportive acts were included in the manual. 
'nle researcher was also asked to make a global assessment of the 
decision-mald.D;J mode employed by the family in the decision-mak:i.rg task. 
'!his was a forced-choice response ani therefore the researcher selected 
one category from these provided on the ratin;J form: groop cxmsensus, 
majority rule, parents' decision, children's decision, .iniividual family 
member decision or other. 
It was originally :inten:ied that the videotapes wcllid be rated by two 
i.ndepen:1ent rab>.rs. Iack of availability of suitable raters and the 
al::lsence of SUfficient financial J:eSOUl"CeS to support this plan resulted 
in the utilization of one extetna1 rater (hereafter called Rater 1). 'Ihe 
ratirr; was done by a male medical student. 'Ihe student was provided 
didactic information arxi discrimination trai.nin;J usirg four videotapes of 
families tested but not eligible for inclusion in this study. High 
interrater agreement was reached between the trainer ani the trainee on 
the four videotapes. Followirg the trai.ni.rx], the student rater made 
i.ndepen:1ent rati!gs of all 24 family videotapes. 
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A rardomization schedule was employed first to determine the order 
in which the medical student (Rater l) would view the tapes. Families 
were numbered consecutively arxl they were taped sequentially in time 
acc:orc.ii.D;J to incl:eas~ family numl::lers. 'Ib ensure a viewin;J order that 
wC1.1ld draw from the time rarr;e evenly, the time ran;e was broken into 
sections with the order of numbers randomized within each section. A 
further ramomization occurred to determine the order of viewi.rq of tapes 
from the various sections. A ran:iomization procedure was also employed 
to select 15 of the 24 tapes for view~ by the :researcher (hereafter 
called Rater 2) for reliability testin;J. A similar procedure to the one 
desc:r.i.bed above was followed to determine the order in which the 
researcher would view the tapes. 
Each family had 12 member pairs for which an estimate of the rnnnber 
of supportive acts was made by the two~ raters. 'Ihe average 
differences in ratin;Js done by Rater 1 and Rater 2 arXI. sununaty statistics 
are reported in Table 2. 'Ihe raters agreed exactly on the number of 
supportive acts in 65.6% + or - 4.9 of the 12 member pairs on average. 
:rurther:more, agreement by one point was achieved in 90.0% + or - 2.3 of 
the member pairs ani agreement by two points was achieved in 
95.0% + or - 1.8 of the member pairs on average. A one-point discrepancy 
in a ratin;J can be considered good agreement clinically because of the 
highly idiosyncratic nature of the behavior bein;J obsetved. 
'Ihe discrepancy obselved in the rat.in.;s of the 12 member pairs was 
oot significantly different from zero on average (all ~ues were 
greater than .13). '!his irdi.cates a lack of rater bias in the sense that 
one rater did not consistently count more supportive acts than the other 
Table 2 
Interrater Reliabilit~: 
Family M SE 
Member 
Pair 
FM .80 .so 
FC4 -.27 .23 
FC3 .93 .94 
MF -.13 .32 
M::4 -.13 .13 
MC3 -.20 .17 
C4F -.07 .46 
C4M -.13 .46 
C4C3 .27 • 21 
C3F -.20 .20 
C3M -.13 .22 
C3C4 .20 .20 
Average DifferenLes in Ratings of SU2E2Ltive ALts b~ Rater 1 and Rater 2 
Pait-ed p-value WilLmon p-value r1edian Min Max 
t-test Signed 
Rank 
1.60 .13 12.00 .10 0 - 1 7 
-1.17 .26 -3.00 .3S 0 - 3 l 
.99 .34 l.SO .59 0 - l 14 
- .41 .69 - .50 1.00 0 - 4 2 
-1.00 .33 -2.50 .42 0 - 1 1 
-1.15 .27 -3.00 .35 0 - 2 1 
- .14 .89 - .so 1.00 0 - 5 4 
- .29 .77 -1.00 .92 0 - 4 4 
1.29 • 22 3.50 .27 0 - 1 2 
-1.00 .33 -4.50 .37 0 - 2 1 
- .62 • 55 -3.50 • 59 0 - 2 1 
1.00 .33 4.SO .37 0 - 1 2 
-"'" 
0 
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rater. For 11 out of the 12 member pairs, raters consistently reported 
high scores arxl low scores. '1he minimu:m Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient was greater than .58 (2-value < = .02). '1he 12th pair had a 
correlation coefficient of .38 (2-value < = .17). 
'Ihe limitation of this method of reliability assessment is that one 
has primarily determined the success of the tra:inin;J. However, this 
method does provide some irxlication of the extent to which the i.nstnrment 
an:i tra.i.n.in; have set objective criteria for another experimenter to 
follow. 'Ihe next level of reliability assessment should involve rati.n;Js 
of the videotapes :by two i:ndepen:lent raters (excludin;J the trainer) am 
should provide more meanin;Jful data on the reliability of the instrument. 
Derived Variables 
'!he original cxmceptual definitions of these five variables, (a) 
equal stl:enJth coalitions, (b) stron:yweak coalitions, (c) clearly 
dominant parent, (d) nearly equal parents, am (e) aqe differences in 
s:i:blin;J pairs, had to be chan;Jed in order to deal with them 
statistically. Table 3 shows the correspcm:1ence of the origiz"!.al 
oonceptua1 definitions of the variables investigate:i and the final 
derived operational definitions. 
Coalitions of equal stre.ngth wem originally intemed to have been 
measured by the presence of a situation in which each coalition type 
(e.g., F->M + M->F) represented 1/6 or 16.6% of the total number of 
supportive statements made by a family. However, since the analyses were 
done at the level of parent-parent, pa&.~-child, and siDlin;J coalitions, 
equal strerv;th of coalitions was in:iicate:i simply by 1/3 or 33.3% of the 
total com~ for each of the three categories. originally it was 
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Table 3 
Corresponience of Original C?perational Definitions with Derived 
Operational Definitions of Variables 
Original Operational Definitions 
1. Equal. strerx{th coalitions 
Six coalition types each 
representin;J 1/6 or 16.6% 
of the total ntliiiber of 
supportive stat:.em=nts 
made by a family: F<->M 
= F<->C4 = F<->C3 = M<->C4 
= M<->C3 = C4<->C3 
2. stron:]Jweak coalitions 
Stron;J coalition- coalition 
st:ren;}th (proportion) greater 
than one st:.amard deviation 
above the mean rrumber of 
supportive statements made 
by all family 11elbers 
Weak coalition= coalition 
st:ren;}th (proportion) greater 
than one st:arx3ard deviation 
below the mean rrumber of 
supportive statements made 
by all family members 
3. Clearly dominant parent 
When one parent was selected 
as likely to be most powerful 
in the decision-maldn:J qan-e 
by three of the four family 
l!eDhers, the parent was clearly 
daninant. 
Derived Operational Defll'litions 
1. Equal stren;tth coalitions 
'Ihree coalition categories, 
parental, sibl:i.m, ani 
parent-ch:ild each repre-
5el'l'tin;1 1/3 or 3 3 • 3% of the 
total rrumber of supportive 
statements made by a family: 
F<->.M = F<->C3 + F<->C4 + 
M<->C3 + M<->C4 = C3<->C4 
2. S1:rory/weak coalitions 
comparisons of the log trans-
formations of each coalition 
cateqo:ry: ISIB = IDG (C4C3 + 
C3C4 + .5); !PAR = I.OG (FM + 
MF + • 5) ; LPC = I.OG (Total 
SUpport-FM-MF-C4C3-C3C4 + • 5) 
3. Clearly dominant parent 
A clarity of dominance 
i.n::licator factor, DIND, was 
derived based on 'Who supported 
whan to a greater extent in 
the decision-makirg game: 
MDIND = (FM-MF) I Total 
suwe>rtive statements, when FM> 
= MF (~ Daninant) 
rnnm = (MF-FM) 1 Total 
supportive statements, 
when FM< = MF (Father Dominant) 
(table continues) 
Original Operational Definitions 
4. Nearly equal. parents 
When both parents were 
enployed outside the home, 
they were considered nearly 
equal in power in family 
decision-mak.irq. 
5. Age differences in the 
sibling pairs 
Close in age was in:licated 
when siblin:r.; were less than 
two years apart in age. 
Distant in age was .iniicated 
when siblings were two years 
or IOOre apart in age. 
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Derived Operational Definitions 
3. Clearly dominant parent 
mDl was derived to represent 
the ratio between coalitions 
er.qaged in by the weaker 
parent with the older child 
vs. coalitions en;aged in 
with the dominant parent. 
IND2 was derived to represent 
the ratio between coalitions 
engaged in by the weaker 
parent with the older child 
vs. coalitions engaged in 
with the YOUIJ;l'er chile.". 
4. Nearly equal parents 
A parental power status factor, 
rx:::M, was derived based on the 
relative frequencies of the 
support provided by the parents 
to each other in the decision-
making game: OOM = ICFM-MF) I 
(FM + MF + l)f • A low OOM score 
in:licated nearly equal status 
parents. 
nmx was a factor derived to 
represent the ratio between 
parent-child coalitions arxi 
sibl~ coalitions. 
5. Age differences in the 
sibli.nq pairs 
A sibling age difference factor, 
DFAG, was derived am computed 
as: DF11G = C4AGE-c3AGE. '!he 
degree of distance in age 
between the older arxi younger 
child was determined by a high 
or low DFAG score. 
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int.erxied that a strorq coalition would exist any time the coalition 
stren;Jth (i.e., proportion) was greater than one starxiard deviation above 
the mean l1\.1lllber of supportive statements made by all families. Likewise, 
a weak ~ition would exist anytime the coalition strength was greater 
than one standan:i deviation below the mean number of supportive 
statements made by all family members. Usin;J this definition create:! a 
situation in which too few families met the criteria to allow for a 
meanin;ful statistical analysis. 
Iook:in;J at the means revealed that the stanjard deviations were 
related to the means over the four primary variables urrler consideration 
(i.e., F->M, M->F, C3->C4, C4->C3). '1he relationship was fairly steady-
larger means went with larger stan::lard deviations. '!his suggested tak.ir¥] 
a loq transform (see Aitchison & Brown, 1957). It may often :be more 
convincin;J to have side by side the frequency distribution that has 
arisen in practice with one constructed by some artificial means. 'Ibis 
is partiall.arly the case with very skewed distributions, since even small 
samples may contain one or two high values which might otherwise be 
suspected. 'lberefore, three variables were constructed that allowed for 
more me.ani.rgful comparisons of coalition st.rer¥fth ani weakness. 'lbe 
variable ISm is the log transformation of the variable SIB (the 
proportion of supportive statments in the family made by C3->C4 + C4->C3) 
an:i it was comp.Ited as too (C4C3 + C3C4 + .5). 'lbe variable LPAR is the 
log transformation of the variable PAR (the proportion of SUR;lOI'tive 
statements in the family made :by M->F + F->M) ani it was comptced as IDG 
(FM + MF + .5). 'Ihe variable IFC is the log transformation of the 
variable FC (proportion of supportive statments in the family made by 
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M->CJ + C3->M + M->C4 + C4->M + F->C3 + C3->F + F->C4 + C4->F) ani it was 
oomp.tted as IDG (Total SUpportive Statements- FM - MF- C4C3 - C3C4 + 
.5). '!be negative values in the computation of LPC are present, since 
LPC is considered the residual of Il?AR am LSIB. 'Ihe addition of 0.5 in 
eadl equation is done to assure that all values are greater than zero. 
A clearly dominant parent was :i.nterrle:i to have been measured by 
usin;J the family members' responses on the pre-experimental decision-
m.a.kirg game questionnaire (see Appen:tix E). If one parent was selected 
by at least three of the four family members on question 3, which asked 
''Which one person do yoo. think is most likely to get his or her way or to 
have the most influence (power) in the decision about how to use the 
$100.00?", then that parent would have been identified as the clearly 
dominant parent. 'lhis method of determinin;J dominance resu1 ted in too 
few families for a meanin;Jful statistical analysis. 
Alternatively, another method of determin.in;J parental dominance was 
derived. A clarity of dominance irxiicator factor (DIND) was derived an::i 
oomp.Ited based on the data, in that parental dominance was defined by who 
supported whom to a greater extent in the decision-maldn;J task. '!bus, 
the dominan:::e iniicator factor was derived as follows: 
MDIND = FM - MF when FM > = MF (Mother Dominant) 
Total SUpport1ve Statements 
miND = MF - FM when FM < = MF (Father Dominant) 
TOtal SUpportive Statements 
Originally it was :int:.eMed that when bath parents were employed 
ootside the home, they would be considered nearly equal. parents with 
respect to their power in family decision-11\aldrg situations. However, 
this proved to be an unsatisfactor.y measure as all parents in this study 
were employed cutside the home. 
An alternative approach to determ:ining nearly equal parents was 
derived from the data. A status factor (OOM) was derived as follows: 
OOM = I (FM-MF) I (FM + MF + l) I 
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'Ihus, a low IX>M score wc:W.d inticate nearly equal status between parents. 
When oonsiderin:] aqe diffeJ:'enCeS between sibl~ in a family, it 
was originally inten::led that those siblin:;!s who were less than two years 
apart in aqe wculd be considerai close in age. 'lhose sibl~ who were 
two years and greater apart in age would be considered distant in age. 
'!his approach resulted in too few cases for a meanin;Jful statistical 
analysis. 
Altematively, a factor was derived from the data to inii.cate aqe 
differences between sibl.in;Js. '!he factor DFM; was derived as follows: 
DFAG = C4AGE - C3AGE 
'Ihus, the degree of distance in age between the the older and youn:;er 
child c:x::W.d be determined by a high or low DFAG score. 
Unless ot:hel:wise qualified, the status of family members was 
identified by the assumption of a hierarchical power chain with 
F>M>C4>C3. 
Data Analysis Procedures 
It was originally inten:led that the six hypotheses woold be tested 
usin;J six different one-way analyses of variance. Glass and Hopkins 
(1984) notEd that when usin;J ANOVA, the assumption of in:iepen:ience of 
c:iJsetvations is necessazy for accurate probability statements. 
Weperdenoe of observations requires that observations within groops not 
be influen::ed by each other. Unfortunately, the design of the 
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~imental task ani the ratin; system created a situation in which the 
obsel:vations (i.e., frequencies of supportive acts between family 
members) were influen::ed by each other. If the observations were 
analyzed as if the data were i.rdepen:ient., the tJ:ue probability of a type-
I error would be apt to be larger than the nominal altxla-
Nonin:!epen:lenc of observations thus increases the probability tllat 
treatment effects will be claimed for ineffective treatments. 'Ihus, 
other more appropriate statistical analyses were employed. 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 stated that "in a family with a st.ron;J parental 
coalition, there is a greater likelihood that children will develop 
strorx;rer si.blin;J coalitions than parent-child coalitions." To test this 
ooalition-camt:ers-coalition effect, the derived variables dj SOlSsed 
above were used (refer to Table 3) : ISIB (I.oq of C3<->C4), !PAR (log of 
M<->F), ani UlC (IaJ of M<->C3 + M<->C4 + F<->C3 + F<->C4). IBIB arxi 
LPAR are within-coalition inlices. LPC is a cross-coalition imex. 
'Ihese iniices were correlated with each other (see Table 4). Notice that 
the only negative correlation was between the two indices of coalition 
formation, ISIB (between siblin;s) ani LPAR (between parents). 
Proctor (1987) su;Jgested a method for addressi.rg the issue of 
interdeperxiencies amorq variables. He reoommerxied doi.n; causal path 
analysis usin;J his method designed from the cutset for fitti.rx] to 
correlations (cf. Joreskog & Sotbom's LISREL, 1978 designed to fit to 
sample oavarianoes). 'Ihe path analysis consists of (a) spec:ifyi.rg a 
causal path diagram, (b) calculati.rg the estimates of the path 
coefficients (which are then used to calculate theoretical correlations) 
Table 4 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Within-Coalition arxl Cross-
Coalition In:lices (N=24) 
I.SIB (1) 
~ (2) 
LPAR (3) 
ISIB (1) 
1.00 
Ire (2) 
r 12 = .33 
1.00 
LPAR (3) 
rl3 = - .12 
r 23 = .19 
1.00 
I.SIB = Ioq transformation of SIB (st.rell;th of sibling coalitions) 
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~ = Ioq transformation of~ (strength of parent-child coalitions) 
LPAR = Ioq transformation of PAR (st.reDJth of parent-parent coalitions) 
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ani (c) calculatin;J a measure of fit between the theoretical arx1 the 
observed correlations. 
'lherefore, to test the significance of the difference between r13 
and (r 23 + r 12) 1 2 namely <P = (r23 + r 12) 1 2 - r 13 , the null 
hypothesis was set up: Ho : <P = .5 p +. 5 p - p = o, and it was 
23 12 13 
tested against Hypothesis l. '1bis means that the significance of the 
difference between r 13 (the correlation between rsm arx1 LPAR) and the 
average of r 23 (the correlation between Ll?C ani !.PAR) ani r 12 (the 
correlation between rsm ani Ll?C) is bein;r tested. 'lhe coalition-
counters-coalition effect is bein;J tested here in that the presence of a 
~parental coalition counters the formation of a strorq parent-child 
coalition am increases the likeliliood of a stron:J siblin:J coalition 
fo:t:lllirg. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 stated that "in a family with one clearly dominant 
parent, there is a greater likelihood that the weaker parent will develop 
a st.rcn;er coalition with the older child than with the other parent or 
the yo.mger child." '1his hypothesis was tested by usin;J the clarity of 
dominance irxlicator (DIND) (refer to Table 3), the derivation ani 
com~tion of which was discussed above. Two other factors were 
comp.lted to determine the ratio of the stren:.Jths of coalitions ergaged in 
by the weaker parent. 
'!be first factor was dominance iniicator l (INDl). In the situation 
PM<MF (i.e., father supported mother less than mother supported father) a 
father dominant situation was apparent. 'lhus, the followin;r ratio was 
oomp.rt:ed (MC4 + C4M} I (MF +PM), which compared the weaker parent's 
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(mother's) coalition strength with the older child (C4) to her coalition 
strength with the dominant parent (father). If FM = MF a value of 0 was 
assigned on the INDl factor, as this represented a situation of equal 
status parents. If FM>MF then a mother dominant situation was present. 
In this situation, the ratio of coalition strength of coalitions entered 
into by the weaker parent (father) with the older child (C4) ani with the 
dominant parent was computed as (FC4 + C4F) 1 (MF + FM). 
'!he secon:i factor, IND2, examined the ratio of coaliton s~ of 
coalitions entered into by the weaker parent with the older vs. the 
younger child. If FM<MF, then a father dominant situation was present. 
'Iherefore, IND2 represented the ratio of the coalition strength of the 
weaker parent's (mother's) coalitions with the older vs. the younger 
child: (MC4 + C4M) I (MC3 + C3M). If FM = MF, a score of 0 was assigne:l 
for IND2 representing equal status parents. If FM>MF, then a mother 
dominant situation was present. IND2 then represented the weaker 
parent's (father's) relative coalition strengths with older vs. youn;er 
child: (FC4 + C4F) 1 (FC3 + C3F). Pearson correlation coefficients were 
computed between DIND ani INDl ani between DIND ani IND2 to test 
Hypothesis 2. 
Hypot:hesis3 
Hypothesis 3 stated that "in a family with two nearly equal parents 
who do not have a stron;J parental coalition, there is a greater 
likelihood that stronger parent-child coalitions than child-child 
coalitions will develop." To test this hypothesis, the OOM (refer to 
Table 3) factor was utilized. Recall that a low OOM score in:iicated 
nearly equal status parents. Also recall that PAR has been designated to 
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represent parental coalitions (i.e., (FM + MF) 1 Total Nu:mbe.r of 
SUpportive statements Made by a Family). '!he ratio of coaliton stJ:'er¢hs 
between parent-child am child-child coalitions was represented by INDX: 
DIDX = (FC3 + C3F + FC4 + C4F + MC3 + C3M + MC4 + C4M) I (C3C4 + C4C3). 
Pearson oorrelation coefficients were comp.Ited. for the three factors 
(i.e., OOM, PAR ani INDX) am no statistically significant correlations 
were foum between the factors. Since there was not a st:J:on] 
intercorrelation amorq the variables, a multiple ra;Jression analysis was 
in order. Two approaams to testin;J Hypothesis 3 were employed. '1be 
first regression was computed usin;J SAS as: MODEL INDX = OOM PAR (i.e., 
INDX was the criterion variable with OOM ani PAR as predictors). A 
se.c:orxi regression model was computed which took into accx::runt the 
interaction between OOM and PAR: MODEL INDX = OOM PAR OOM*PAR. 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 stated that "st:rcln; si.blin;J coalitions are more likely 
to form between same-sex siblin:js than between opposite-sex siblin;s." 
To test this hypothesis, a siblin;J sex factor was computed (i.e., SS). 
If the sex of a sibling pair was the same, then ss = 1. If the sex of a 
siblin;r pair was opposite, then ss = o. Recall that siblin;J coalitions 
are represented by SIB (i.e., SIB= (C3C4 + C4C3) 1 Total Number of 
SUWOrtive statements Made by a Family). To test Hypothesis 4, a ~-test 
was com~ lookinq at sm as the depen::1ent variable ani usi.rg the ss 
factor as the two groups bei.rg compared To test this hypothesis the 
rull hypothesis was set Ho: IJ = '1.1 ard was tested against H1: '1.1 < IJ • 1 2 1 2 
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Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 state:i that 11~ si.blin] coalitions axe more 
likely to form between si.blin;rs who are closer as~ to more distant 
in age." Recall that ~ (refer to Table 3) was com:p.rt:.ed to represent 
the differen::e in age between the older child (C4) an::l the ~er child 
(C3) in each family. Us.in;J SIB as representative of the stren;Jth of the 
siblin;r coalition, a Pearson con-elation coefficient was oomputed between 
~ am sm, as well as computin] a regression analysis with SIB as the 
criterion variable an::l DFAG as the predictor variable. 
HYpothesis6 
Hypothesis 6 state:i that "family members will give stJ:on;Jer support 
to the higher status family member in the decision-makirg task." 'Ihis 
hypothesis was based on the theoretical assumption that F>M>C4>C3. To 
test this hypothesis, four variables were oomputed which rep:resent:a:i the 
support received by each family member. '!he four variables arxl their 
computations axe presente:i below: 
FS = MF + C3F + C4F 
MS = FM + C3M + C4M 
C4S = FC4 + MC4 + C3C4 
C3S = FC3 + MC3 + C4C3 
Means were oom:t:Uted for each of these four variables ani a test of 
difference betwee.a"l correlated means was complted usin] a one-tailed 
~-test. 
Validity arxi Reliability of Measurements 
One methodolCXJical problem of previous investigations of coalitions 
in families is the way in which coalitions have been meastn:ei. No stu:ly 
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was identified which reported aey determination of construct validity. 
'lhe present study adapted the operational definition of a coalition 
derived by Bonacich, Grusky am Peyrot (1981) to the pu.:poses of this 
investigation. As stated above, coalitions were measured as a 
proportion (i.e., the frequency of supportive statements made by two 
family members to each other compared to the total nu:mber of supportive 
statements made by all family members durirg the experimental decision-
makin;J task). 'Ibis measure of coalitions had not been subjected to aey 
test of construct validity. 
Since one major focus of this study was to develop a reliable ani 
valid measure of family coalitions, a rather extensive validation 
analysis was performed. Construct validity of putative causes am 
effects is what rese.aJ:dlers are concerned with when they worry about 
conf~. Since this validity is crucial in ~iments in which 
causal propositions are bein; tested, the results of the validation 
analysis will be presented with the results of the tests of hypotheses in 
the next chapter. 
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'Ihere were two pu:.tpOSeS in this research: (a) to test two theories 
of coalition formation in families, ani (b) to test the reliability ani 
validity of an instrument designed for measur.irq family coalitions. 'lhe 
results from the data analyses required for testirg the six hypothesis 
are presented in this chapter. 'lhe first five hypotheses examined 
caplow's (1968) power coalition formation theo:cy. Only one hypothesis was 
supported, therefore, the theory had limited predictive ability in this 
sample of families. 'lbe sixth hypothesis examined Bonacich, Grusky, ani 
Peyrot's (1981) status maintenance theory based on a stron;J parental 
coalition. Only partial support was founi for this hypothesis. 'lbe 
validity of the primary construct, family coalition, was tested t.hrough 
correlational analyses which resulted in a tren::l toward oonveJ:gence of 
the various measures employed. 
caplow' s 'Iheory of Coalitions in Families 
caplow's (1968) theory of coalitions in families was based on his 
earlier theory (caplow, 1956) canc:ernin; coalitions in organizations. 
Assumi.rq that the family consists of a hierarchical power ti1ain composed 
of F>M>C4>CJ, caplow•s theory implies that certain coalitions rather than 
others will form. His stated prediction was that the coalition structure 
will be either the father ard the mother versus the two children or the 
mother ani the older child versus the father an:i the ~ child. 
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HyPothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 was a test of the coalition-counters-coalition effect. 
'Ibis means that when a st.ron} parental coalition is present in a family, 
the likelihood of formation of a st.ron} sibling coalition is increased 
while the formation of a stJ:'or¥;J parent-child coalition is countered by 
the presence of the st.ron;J parental coalition. causal path analysis was 
selected as the method of choice because of the intel:deperxiencies among 
variables. 'Ihe null hypothesis was set to represent the relationship of 
the variables in the population: H0 : ~ = .5 P 23 + .5 P 12 - P 13 = o. 
'Ihis means that the difference between r 13 [the correlation between 
siblirx.J coalition st.rergth (ISIB) am parent coalition stren;Jth (LPAR)] 
and the average of r 23 [the correlation between parent-child coalition 
stJ:erqt:h ~) am LPARJ am r 12 (the correlation between U:C and ISIB) 
is statistically eqJal. to zero. '!he alternative hypothesis was 
represented by the following equation usin;J the obsel:ved correlations 
from the sample: ~ = (r23 + r 12)/2 - r 13 = .3769. Usin;J Pearson and 
Filon's (1898) algorithm, the covariances of the correlations between 
ISIB, LPAR, am uc were c:om);Xlted (see Table 5) and were used to firxi 
the~ error of ~ which was .1994. '!his gives a test statistic of 
t = ~ = 1.8895. Beport:in] the one-tailed probability from the Table 
- SE( ~) 
of staniard Unit Normal Distribution, we fim .!:_ = 1.8895 to be 
significant at the 3% level. 
'lherefore, the null hypothesis was rejected arxi support was foorrl 
for the alternative hypothesis. '!he data supported the predicted 
relationship of the coalition-counters-ooalition effect. In this sample, 
a family with a st.rcrq parental coalition terxied to have a st.ron;er 
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Table 5 
Covariances of the Correlations Between Within-coalition ani cross-coalition 
Irxlices (N=24) 
!SIB 
I..R: 
LPAR 
!SIB 
.0378 
I..R: 
.0086 
.0463 
!SIB = log transformation of SIB (stren:Jth of s.il:llin;J coalitions) 
LPAR 
-.0060 
.0154 
.0443 
I..R: = Log transfonnation of PC (strength of parent-child coalitions) 
LPAR =log transformation of PAR (stren;th of parent-parent coalitions) 
siblin;1 coalition than parent-child coalition. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicted the type of coalition most likely entered 
into by the weaker parent in a family with a clearly dominant parent. 
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'!he ratio between the coalitions en:Jaged in by the weaker parent with the 
older child vs. coalitions engaged in with the dominant parent (INDl) 
should be large in the presence of a clearly dominant parent [high score 
on clarity of dominance factor (DniD)]. 'Ihe ratio between the coalitions 
engaged in by the weaker parent with the older child vs. coalitions 
engaged in with the younger child (IND2) should also be lru:ge in the 
presence of a high score on onm. 
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated for onm an:i niDl 
ani for DIND am IND2. '!be correlation coefficient for DIND am INDl was 
- • 15 (£-value<= • 48) and for DIND and IND2 it was .01 (£-Value<== 
.98). 'Itlese correlations were so low they were considered unimportant. 
In addition they were statistically nonsignificant. 
'Iherefore, the null hypothesis was accepted am the alte:rnative 
hypothesis was rejecte:l. 'Ihe data failed to provide evidence to support 
any particular pattern of coalition formation between the weaker parent 
am the children in families with one clearly dominant parent. 
Hypc?thesis 3 
'lhe predicted relationship between the variables in Hypothesis 3 
was that families receivin;1 a low score on the factor representing 
nearly equal status between the parents (OOM) an:i a low score on the 
factor representing strength of parental coalition (PAR) would receive a 
high score on the factor representin;J the ratio between parent-child 
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coalitions am sibli.rg coalitions (INDX). 'lhus the expected correlation 
between INDX ani OOM am the correlation between INDX ani PAR were to 
have been negative. Pearson correlation coefficients were computed ani 
revealed no statistically significant relationship between the variables 
(see Table 6). 
TWo multiple regression equations were computed in an effort to 
discover more detailed information ~ the relationship between 
these variables. '!he first regression equation identified :rnox (the ratio 
of coalition st.reil;iths between parent-child an::l child-ch.ild coalitions) 
as the criterion variable with OOM (parental power status factor) ani PAR 
parental coalition st:ren;Jth) as the predictor variables. 'Ihe re-"'Ults 
revealed an g2 of .09 , £: = .48, and E < .63. Therefore, we conclude 
that the mcd.el does nat fit the data. 
One additional regression analysis was computed which took into 
consideration the interaction between OOM am PAR. 'Ihus, INDX was the 
criterion variable ani OOM, PAR ani the OOM-PAR interaction were the 
pmdictor variables. '!he results provided only a slight gain aver the 
first equation: g2 = .15, ~=.52, and E < .68. The second model did not 
fit the data either. 
'lhel:efore, the null hypothesis was accepted an:i the alternative 
hypothesis was rejected. '!here was no evidence to support the notion 
that parent-child coalitions terxi to be st:ron:Jer than child-child 
coalitions in families with two nearly equal parents who do not have a 
stron:J parental coalition. 
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Table 6 
Pearson COrrelation COefficients Between INDX an:! OOM an:i Between INDX 
and PAR (N=l3) 
PAR 
.25 .04 
OOM = Parental power status factor 
PAR = stren:;rth of parent-parent coalitions 
INDX =Ratio of coalition strengths between parent-child ani child-child 
coalitions 
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Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 predicted the relationship between the sex, of the 
siblirq pair in a family arrl the S't:ren3th of the sibli.rg coalition (SIB). 
Us .in;)' sm as the dependent variable, it was predicted that the mean of 
Group 1 (i.e., opposite-sex sibli.rg pairs) would be smaller than the mean 
of Group 2 (i.e., same-sex siblirq pairs). A ~-test was compute:i on 
these two sample means am the results are reported in Table 7. Because 
of the directionality aspect of the alternative hypothesis, a one-tailed 
test of significance was used. 'Ihis results in a c::h.an;Je in the )2-value 
to E. < .25. 
'lherefore, the null hypothesis was accepted arrl the alternative 
hypothesis was rejected. Even though same-sex siblin;J coalition S't:ren3th 
was slightly larger than opposite-sex siblin;J coalition S't:ren3th, this 
difference failed to meet the level of statistical significance. 
Hypot:hesis5 
'Ihe relationship between age differences in the siblirq pairs an:l 
the S't:ren3th of the siblin;J coalitions in families was examined in the 
test.in:J of Hypothesis 5. D~ was the variable computed to represent age 
differences between the sibl~ pairs. A low score on DFAG represente:i 
closeness in age between the siblin:] pairs, while a high score on DFAG 
represented a siblin;J pair who were distant in age. '!he predicted 
relationship between DFAG ani SIB (i.e., the measure of the stren:;th of 
the siblirq coalition) was negative. In other woros, when the DFAG score 
was low, the strength of the siblirg coalition would be stron;r. A 
Pearson correlation coefficient was computed between the variables DFAG 
am sm. 'Ihe results revealed no statistically significant relationship 
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Table 7 
Test of sample Means Between same-sex ani Opposite-sex Sibling Pairs on 
the strefBth of the Siblin:J Coalition 
Group !! M SD T ;e-vaJ.ue 
Opposite-sex 12 .10 .14 -.66 .51 
Siblin;J Pair 
Same-Sex Siblin] 12 .15 .17 -.66 .51 
Pair 
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between the variables (Pearson correlation coefficient was .05). 
A regression analysis was compu:t:OO in an attempt to gain more 
detailed information about the relationship between the two variables. 
sm was identified as the criterion variable ard DFM; was the predictor 
variable. 'Ihe results of the regression inlicated that If was .002, I= 
.OS, J2. < .82. 'Ihese fi.n:lin;Js suggested that the mcxiel. did not fit the 
data. 
'lherefore, the null hypothesis was accepted ard the alternative 
hypothesis was rejected. 'Ihe data failed to show arrt significant 
relationship between age differences in the sibling pairs an:i the 
strength of the sibling coalitions. 
Bonacich, Grusky am Peyrot's status Maintenance 'Iheory 
Hypot:hesis 6 
Hypothesis 6 examined the status maintenance assumption in family 
organization. 'Ihis assumption is that the family system is composed of a 
hierarchical power chain with F>M>C4>C3. '!he theory predicted that 
family members would attempt to l'l!aintain this organizational structure by 
givin;r stron;Jer support to the higher status family meml:ler in the 
decision-maki.n;r task. Four variables were computed to represent the 
support received by each family member (i.e., FS, MS, C4S, C3S). Table 8 
shows the means am starxiard deviations for the support received by each 
family member. 'lhe means of the support received by each family member 
partially supported Hypothesis 6. 'Ihat is the mother received slightly 
more support than the father received, but this differerx:e was not 
statistically significant. No statistically significant difference was 
fam:l between the support received by the older child as cwosed to the 
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Table 8 
SUmma.ey statistics for SUpport ReceivEd by Each Family Member from All 
other Family Members (N=24) 
SUpported Member M SD ~E RarYJe 
Father (FS) 5.00 5.03 1.03 0-18 
Mother (MS) 5.33 6.16 1.26 0-25 
Older Child ( C4S) 2.50 3.04 .62 0-10 
Yourqer Child (C3S) 1. 75 3.05 .62 0-14 
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support received by the youn;Jer child either. However, a test of 
difference between correlated means, usin;J a one-tailed test of 
significance, revealed a statistically significant difference between the 
support received by the father as opposed to that received by the older 
child c~ = 2.01, e < .o2). 
From the data it can be conclude1. that the parents received 
significantly more support than the children. While the differential 
support given mother vs. father ani older child vs. yourger child should 
be noted, the real difference in this support was not statistically 
significant. 
'lherefore, the null hypothesis was accepted ani the alternative 
hypothesis was rejected. 'llle data failed to support the predicted 
preser.ration of the family organizational power hierarchy F>M>C4>C3. 
Parents did maintain their superior position vis-a-vis the children. 
However, mother received slightly more support from all family members 
than father received. 
Convergence of Irxiicators of Coalitions 
'lbe measure of coalition employed for this study had not been 
subjected previoosly to aey type of validation analysis. Since the 
t:est:i.rq of theoretical assumptions about the formation of coalitions in 
families ~ upon the utilization of a valid measure of the construct, 
validation analysis was performed as a part of this study. 
Recall that in a family of two parents am two children, there are 
six possible two-member coalitions: mother with father, mother with 
older child, mother with YOlll'¥1er child, father with older child, father 
with yam:;Jer child, am older child with yt'JI.I1'YJei' child. '!he operational 
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definition of stren;Jth of a:ey of the six coalitions was the number of 
supportive statements made by two family members to each other compared 
to the total J'lU1l1ber of supportive statements made by all family members. 
'!he stren;Jth of each coalition was determineil by an external rater who 
observed all videotape:l family decision-makin;r tasks. 
Five different methods of validatin;J the major construct, stren;Jth 
of family coalitions, were use:i in this study. since the operational 
definition was determined by a rational decision of two family 
researc:hers, one of the five validation methods was a ratill;1 of the 
coalitions observed by a clinician. '!he other four methods of validation 
used responses by family members to questions about whether the outcome 
of the decision was what they wanted, whether the outcome was fair, 
whether these were typical teams (coalitions) of family members who side 
with each other, and in which mode decisions are usually made. 'Ihe 
assumption was that the stren;Jth of the coalitions determined by the 
external rater wc:uld COII\Terqe with the~ of the coalitions 
measured by the clinician and with the responses to the four questions by 
family members. 
Cronbach (1971) noted that, on aey given measure, persons or groups 
who score high CA.lght to score high on other :irdicators of the same 
constnu::t. 'Ihese imi.cators may be other tests, behavioral ratin:;Js, or 
reports about the social groups to which a person bel<Jll3S. 'Ihe 
particular measure bein;J investigated is related to other measures 
presumed to be irxli.cators, though sometimes weak or ini:irect ones, of the 
same canst:ruct. SUch an investigation looks for convergence of 
.in:li.cators. Convergence means that the measures at least teni to vary in 
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the same direction. In exami.ni.n; convergence, no one of the irxiicato:rs 
is taken as a criterion or staroard. Although imicators of the same 
construct are expected to converge, high correlations are not necessarily 
expected. 'Ihe sex>re on an observation is influenced by social-
psychological elements in the situation, specific qualities of the 
stimuli, characteristics of the obseiver, an:i other variables. 
cam];i)ell ani Fiske (1959) argued that measures of the same construct 
derived from dissimilar data ought to converge. 'lhey suggestei that a 
correlational study of validity should encompass measures of the 
construct measured by two or more methods. 'Ihe assessment of the 
convergence trerxls are given bel011. 
Clinical ObseriJation 
One of the methods of testin:;J the convergence of measures of a given 
construct is to use ratin:]s by an expert in the area of :investigation. 
'Ihe expert in this sbJdy was an experienced graduate level social worker. 
'Ihe social worker had extensive experience in structural family therapy 
(Minuchin, 1974). Coalitions are well-defined in structural family 
therapy ani their identification within family systems is an integral 
part of the therapeUtic model. 'Ihe social worker was asked to rate the 24 
family videotapes withrut prior knowledge of the hypotheses to be tested 
or the operational definition of the construct used in the study. 'Ihe 
expert was told to score each of the six types of coalitions in the 
families on a global basis. Each coalition type was assigned a score 
from a continuum of 0 (not present in this family) to 10 (~ 
possible coalition type). '1hese expert soores were correlated with the 
medical student rater's scores (Rater 1) usin;r Spearman's rank 
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correlation coefficient, since the scores were net numerically equivalent 
from one ern of the scale to the other. 'lbese correlations are presented 
in Table 9. All correlations were positive, therefore t.erdin;J toward 
cornrergen:::e, even though the stJ:'en:;Jth of the correlations was rather low. 
only one correlation was statistically significant (i.e., the ratin:Js of 
the M<->C3 dyad). 
EXpected Ol.ttcome 
A seconi method of test:in; the construct validity of family 
coalitions was to compare the researcher's measure with family 
members' responses about the outcome of the decision-maldn;r game. 'Ihe 
medical student rater's (Rater 1) ratin;r-; of the six coalition types 
were correlated. with one of the outcome measures scored by all family 
members. Fach family member was a.skei to resporxi to a question on the 
post-elepet'i.mental game questionnaire that resporxied to their feelin;s 
about the outcome of the decision.-maki.n;J game. 'lbe question asked: 
''Ihi.nk about what yc:u said yc:u wantEd to do with the money before the 
game started. How much of what you wanted would you say you got as a 
result of the discussion?" 'lhe family members select:OO. a score from a 
continuum (i.e., o represented havi.n:J gotten "none of what I wanted" 
an:i 10 represented havi.n:] gotten "all of what I wante:i''). 
'lhe results from the correlational analysis of this ootoome measure 
with the ratin;s of the six coalition types revealed few statistically 
significant relationships between variables {see Table 10). When the 
coalition was sLtaq l:letween mother am youn;;er cllild, father temed to 
report low satisfaction with the outcome. '!he older child ten:ia:i to 
report a low level of satisfaction when the coalition strergt:h was stron:.:J 
Table 9 
Spe.arman's Rank Correlation coefficients of Videotape Ra.tirqs of Six 
coalition rrypes by Rater 1 am the EXpert Clinical Rater (N=22) 
Rater 1 Expert Rater (coalition '!We) 
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(Coalition Type) M<->F M<->C4 M<->C3 F<->C4 F<->C3 C3<->C4 
M<->F .13 
M<->C4 .20 
M<->C3 .47* 
F<->C4 .10 
F<->C3 .11 
C3<->C4 .18 
*E <.02 
Table 10 
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficients Between Rater l's Ratin;;s of 
Six Coalition 'IyPes am Family Members' Reports of satisfaction with 
outcare on Experimental Decision-MakiJ'y Task (N=24) 
Coalition rrypes 
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M<->F M<->C4 M<->C3 F<->C4 F<->CJ C3<->C4 
SATISrM -.23 .19 -.30 .07 .05 .31 
SATISFF .24 -.20 -.40a .17 .01 -.20 
SATISFO .06 .10 .13 -.32 -.07 -.17 
SATISFC4 -.30 .15 .25 -.14 -.49c .44b 
~ < .05 
~ < .04 
~< .02 
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between father ani yOlll'qer child. However, older child terxied to report 
high levels of satisfaction when there was a stron;J coalition with the 
youn;Jer sibl~. 'Iherefore, no clear pattern of converqenc:e was apparent 
in the cc:mparisons between these measures. 
Fairness of Outcome 
A third methcxl of testing construct validity was to compare the 
researcher's measure with family members' responses about their feelin;Js 
of faimess about the outcome. A sec:orxi question from the post-
experimental decision-ma.Jd..rq game questionnaire asked: "All t:hirgs 
considered, how fair would you say the decision was?" 'Ihe family members 
selected a scx:>re from a continuum (i.e., o represente:i "complete 
unfairness" ani 10 represented "complete fairness"). 
'!he results of the correlational analysis of this outcome measure 
can be seen in Table 11. On the measure of fairness, father terrled to 
report feelin;s of unfairness about the outcome when there was a strong 
coalition between mother arxi older child. Father tended to report st.ron;J 
feelin;Js of fairness, when a stron;J coalition existed between older child 
arxi yourger child. 'lberefore, the comparisions between these measures 
in:ticate:i no clear pattem of convergence. 
'l)'pical Coalitions 
A foorth methcxi of t:esti.n;J the validity of the construct family 
coalition was COl'¥iUcted by gatherin;J data from each family member 
regardin;J their perceptions of the similarities between the coalitions 
they observed in the ~imental decision-makin] task arxi the coalitions 
that typically occur when their family tries to make a decision. '!he 
question was asked on the post-experimental decision-makin;J game 
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Table 11 
Speaman's Rank Correlation Coefficients Between Rater l's Ratings of 
Six Coalition '1\'peS ani Family Members' Reports of Faimess of outcorre 
on Experinvmt:al Decision-Makin;J Task (N=24) 
rut:cclme Coalition rrypes 
Measures M<->F M<->C4 M<->C3 F<->C4 F<->C3 C3<->C4 
F2URM -.18 .01 .01 .12 .16 .33 
FAIRF -.14 -.s1h -.09 .23 .29 .47a 
l7\IRC3 -.17 .06 -.20 .oo .24 .30 
FAIRC4 .03 -.22 .11 -.21 .31 -.04 
~ < .02 
~ < .01 
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q.leStionnaire: "Are these 1 teams' or persons siclin;r together the typical 
or usual ways that people act in your family when tl:yirg to make a 
decision?" Family members either resporded l=Yes, 2=No, or 3=0ther. 
Family members' responses are :reported in Table 12. 
'1he results revealed that all four family members agreed that the 
coalitions obserled in the ~imental game were the typical coalition 
patterns in five families. Six families showed positive agreement in the 
:respcmses of three out of four family members. Ani five families 
indicated positive agreement in two out of four family members' 
responses. 'Iherefore, there was a trerxi toward cornrergence between these 
measures. 
M:lde of outc::c:me 
A fifth method of testirq the w.J.idity of the construct family 
coalition was o:niucted by attempt.irt;J to determine the extent of 
agreement between Rater l's rating of the dec:ision-makin;J mode employed 
by the family in the decision-makinq game an:i the parents' report of the 
family's dec:ision-makin; mode in four different decisionin;J areas (i.e., 
children, chores, use of free time, arx1 money). 'Ihe question was asked 
of the parents in the semistructured intel:view: ''Ihink al:xJut the last 
time your family had to make a decision in the a:rea of (an issue about 
one or mo:re of the children). How was the decision made?" 'lbe 
categories for types of decision-makirg mode were {a) groop consensus, 
{b) majority rule, {c) parents' decision, {d) children's decision, {e) 
in:iividual. family member's decision, arx1 {f) other. Rater l rated each 
family on decision-maki.n:] mode usin;r these six categories, after ratin;J 
the coalitions in each family videotape. 
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Table 12 
Family Members 1 Percept:ions of Similarities Between OJal.itions in the 
Experimental Decision-Maki.rg Game am the 'lYPical OJal.itions Occurrirq in 
the Family (N=24) 
Family Father Y~er Child Older Child 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 3 3 3 3 
3 1 1 1 1 
4 1 1 3 3 
5 2 2 2 2 
6 1 2 1 1 
7 1 2 2 2 
8 2 1 1 1 
9 1 1 1 1 
10 1 1 1 1 
11 3 1 2 2 
12 1 1 3 2 
13 1 1 1 1 
14 3 1 1 1 
15 1 2 3 1 
16 3 2 1 2 
17 2 2 3 1 
18 1 1 3 
19 1 2 1 1 
20 3 1 1 1 
21 1 2 1 2 
22 1 3 3 1 
23 3 1 1 1 
24 2 1 2 2 
1=Yes 
2=No 
3=0ther 
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Determin:in;J a measm:e of agreement for these imeperrlent ratin;r.; of 
decision-maki.n:J mode required measurin;J the reliability betWeen the two 
observers. Bishop, Fienberg arxi Hollwxl (1975) suggested that agreement 
can be reqcmied as a special case of association. '!be distinction 
between agreement arxi association for nominal data is that for two 
responses to agree, they must fall into the identical category, while for 
two responses to be perfectly associated we only require that we can 
predict the category of one response from the category of the other 
response. Cohen (1960) proposed the Kappa ( K) as a measure of agreement 
between two observers classifyin;J subjects into two nominal categories. 
'!be Kappa statistic has been exteroed to mu1 ticategoey classifications 
arx:l used to assess not only reproducibility but also validity. 
Kappa (see Maclure & Willett, 1987) was meant to be an improvement 
on the simpler measure, per cent of agreement, because it discounts the 
proportion of agreement which is expected by chance alone (P e>. Instead 
of the total proportion of observations on which there is agreement (Po> 
l::>ein;J compared as a ratio with its maximum value (100%), the attrilJutable 
proportion (P0 - P e>- the fraction of observations for which agreement 
can be attrib.rt:ed to the reproducibility of the observations rather than 
to mere chance-is compared as a ratio with its maximum possible value (1 
- Pe). Thus, K = (P0 -Pe) I (1-Pe). 
comparisons of Rater 1 's ratin;Js of decision-maJtin3 mode in the 
experimental decision-maki.n:J game arx:l the parent's ratirgs of decision-
makin3 mode in four different decisionin] areas (i.e., children, chores, 
use of free time, arx:l money) were made to determine the respective P0 for 
each set of comparisons. In the area of money decisions P0 = .17. For 
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decisions i.nvolvin;J delegation of responsibility for chores, the P0 = 
.13. Decision-maki.rg in the area of issues relatei to the children 
showed P 0 = .21. 'Ihese three proportions were so small that Kappa was 
nat computed. 'Ihe strorgest agreement (P0 = .54) occurred when Bater l's 
ratirgs of decision-maki.IY;r mode in the experiinental task were compared to 
the parents' ratin:;s of decisian-mak:in;J mcxie in the area of the use of 
free time. 
Table 13 summarizes the frequency of agreement between Bater 1's 
rati.n;Js ard the parents' ratfn3s on each of the six categories of 
decision-makin:;J mode. When Kappa was computed for these agreements, the 
results i.n:iicated that Kappa was .0039. A Kappa statistic of this 
magnitude in:licated that the extent of agreement between Rater 1 's 
ratirgs ard the parents• ratirxJs of decision-mald.rq mode oo::urred 
essentially :by chance. 'Iherefore, there appears to be no conve..""gence of 
this~ with Rater 1 1s ratirgs. 
conclusions About Convergent Validity 
COOk arxi campbell (1979) noted that for researdlers interested in 
theory ~' it is almost as important to show that the variables 
involved in the researdl have constJ:uct validity arxl internal validity as 
it is to show a causal relationship between the variables. Kerlin;Jer 
(1979) echced Cook arxl campbell's position arxi argued that for an 
instrument to be valid, it must measure what the instrument-maker wants 
to measure ani thinks he/she is measuring. 
'!he finfugs from this construct validation analysis pointed out 
what Kerlirqer (1979) called the "Ac:hilles' heel" of behavioral research. 
'lhat is, too often investigations are carefUlly planned ani executed with 
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Table 13 
Frec:l\lel'CY ot ~ent Between Rater l's Rat!!E o! Decisicn-M~ Mode in 
the ExPerimental Game am the Parents' Rati.n:f of Declsioo-Maki.J'Q Mode in 
the .AJ:ea ot Use ct Fraa Time CN-24) 
·:A!rants· Rater 1' 8 RatliijB 
Ratin;Ja ~ Majority Pal:ents' adldren's Irdividual. other Total 
Q:l'lSensus Me Dacisicn Decisicn Family Mel\t)er' s 
Declsial. 
GrcAlp 12 2 0 0 0 2 16 
OXlsenSUs 
Majority 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rule 
:Rlrents' 6 0 1 0 0 0 7 
I')ecisim 
Childmn'• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Qlciaial 
Irdividual 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
l'Dily 
Jl l•z'• 
JW::i•im 
ot:Mr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tot:al 19 2 1 0 0 2 24 
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too little attention paid to the measurement of the variables of the 
research. 'Ihe whole measurement procedure of even simple variables is 
highly irxtirect, complex, arxi often difficult. Tests an::i measurements 
ImJSt be used with caution arxi discretion. 
In this study the researcher planned an elaborate experiment to test 
hypotheses from two theories of coalition formation in families. 'lbe 
chain of reasonin;r from the experimental implications of the theories 
seemed valid. '!he experimental procedures were carefully planned am 
exeo.Ited to test the deductions. Specific statistical predictions were 
made al:xJut the relationships between the variables uroer investigation. 
Arrj of several factors could have affected validity. '1he theo:r:y could 
have been faulty, the experiment could have been inadequately planned, 
the subjects coold have been unsuitably chosen, the instruments coold 
have been invalid. Since there had been no validation of the measure of 
the dependent variable, family coalitions as the proportion of supportive 
statements dyads made to each other in a decisionin;J task, a major 
J;mpOSe of this study was to :run the experiment to test its validity. 
In order to measure a variable adequately, the researcher has to use 
more than one exemplar. Both constJ:uct validity arxi reliability can be 
threatened, since si.n;Jle operations both 'Ul'Xierreprese constJ:ucts arxi 
oontain irrelevancies (Cook & campbell, 1979). No sirqle measure is 
perfect. 'Ihe probability is high that even if significant differences 
exist between variables, they will not be detected simply because the 
measure of the depement variable is not reliable or valid enough to pick 
up the differences. COnstruct validity was such a major corx::ern of this 
experiment that plans were made for testing construct valid! ty. Data 
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analyses were performed which examined convet"gent validity between the 
measure am other in:iicators of the same const:J:uct. 
'Ihe fin::lin;J of no support for the construct validity of the measure 
of family coalitions resulted in a serious threat to the internal 
validity of the study. 'Ihe term internal validity was used by Cook ani 
campbell (1979) to refer to "the validity with which statements can be 
made about whether there is a causal relationship from one variable to 
another in the form in which the variables were manipulated or measured'' 
(p. 38). 
COOk am campbell (1979) concluded that the important point is that 
construct validity consists of more than simply assessin;J the fit between 
planned constructs and the operations that were tailored to these 
constructs. It is cpite reasonable to use the obtained pattem of data 
to edit thinJdn;J about both cause am effect constructs. 'Ihe researcher 
can suggest, after the fact, other constructs that might fit the data 
better than those with which the experiment began. Implications for 
future research and further development of the construct, family 
coalition, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPI'ER rv 
SUMMARY, DISaJSSION, AND IMPLICATIONS 
SUnunaty 
'!he major conceptual focus of this research was to expan::l 
systematically the investigation of family power beyord the marital dyad. 
Collective power dynamics were examined by measuril'g the variety of 
coalitions that form in multiple-member, nonclinical family groups. '!his 
study was designed to generate empirical evidence to challenge the belief 
that coalitions other than parent-parent coalitions are pathological. 
'!be purposes of the study were (a) to test two theories of coalition 
formation in families, ard (b) to test the reliability arxi validity of an 
instrument designed for measuring family coalitions. 
Usin:j data from 24 two-parent, two-children, nonclinical families, 
this research examined the types of coalitions am the con:iitions umer 
which they develop in a conflictual decision-makin:;r situation simulated 
experilnentally in the laboratocy. ~data were collecta:i via 
psychological inventories, questionnaires, face-to-face interviews, an:i 
videotaped family interactions. 
Coalitions were measured as a proportion (i.e., the frequency of 
sut:POrtive statements made by two family members to each other compared 
to the total number of supportive statements made by all family members 
durin; the experilnental decision-making game). '!he six possible 
CX)alition types in a family of four (F<->M, F<->C3, F<->C4, M<->C3, 
M<->C4, am C3<->C4) were aggiegated am examined at the level of parent, 
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parent-child, ard si.blin;J coalitions. 'lheoretical assumptions about the 
relationship between various structural variables in the family arxi the 
likelihood of a particular type of coalitional pattern developin;J were 
investigated. 
'lbe relative st:rengt:h of siblirq coalitions versus parent-child 
coalitions was examined under the existing conlition of as~ parental 
coalition in the family. U:rxler the con::lition of one clearly dominant 
parent in the family, the coalitional pattern of the weaker parent was 
examined. In family situations in which two parents had nearly equal 
status arxi did not have a strorg parental coalition, the relative 
stre.rqth of parent-child coalitions versus siblin;J coalitions was 
investigated. Qlaracteristics of the sibling pair (i.e., differences 
versus similarities in age ani sex of each siblin;J) were compared against 
the relative st:rengt:h of the siblirq coalition in the family. Finally, 
the relative st:rengt:h of the support received by each family member was 
determined. Of these structural family variables, only the existence of 
a strorq paJ:enta! coalition significantly predicted the coalitional 
patterns in the family. 
Disotssion of the Finiings 
Of the six hypotheses that were presented, only the first of six was 
supported empirically. In this sample, a family with a stron;J parental 
coalition ten::led to have stron;er siblirq coalitions than parent-child 
coalitions just as Hypothesis 1 predicted. 'Ibis fi.rxlin:] differs from the 
relationship that was identified by Bonacich, Gr.lsky ani Peyrot (1981) in 
their testirq of cap1ow•s (1968) theoey. In their study of 48 four-
person families, they identified high levels of mutual parental support 
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reflective of a stron;J parental coalition. However, the childl:en in 
their st1Jdy did not form the predicted coonter coalition because they 
showed no tenjency to support each other in disp.ltes. One major 
difference in the methodology between the study by Bonacich et al. ani 
this study was its use of retrospective report:W;; of past conflict 
situations as opposed to videotaped observations of an actual, albeit 
simulated, conflict situation. 'lhe co-existence of stron;J parental and 
strorJ;J sibl:W;; coalitions in this stable, nonclinica.l sample challenges 
the commonly held belief that coalitions other than parental ones are 
pathological. Minuchin (1974) has acknowledged the necessity of parental 
ani, to a lesser extent, sibl:W;; coalitions for normal family functions. 
Hypothesis 2 addressed caplow's (1968) proposition about the 
formation of revolutionary coalitions in families. A family power 
structure dominated by one of the parents was hypothesized to be more 
likely to contain revolutionazy coalitions between the weaker parent ani 
the older child. Recall that revolutionaey coalitions subvert the 
organizational power structure i:tj reduci.n; the most powerful to the least 
powerful. 'lhe data failed to show aey particular coalition pattem 
between the weaker parent and the children. one poss:ilile explanation for 
this finiin;J may have to do with the interdependencies of the measures 
bei.n; investigated. Specifically, the i.nllcator factor for clarity of 
parental dominance was derived from the same data source (i.e., 
freq.IenCies of supportive acts) as were the coalitional measures 
themselves. Also, when the total amo.mt of support received from all 
family members was considered, the difference between the amount of 
suwort received by father versus mother was nonsignificant. 'lhe latter 
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fimin;J raises questions about whether or not true parental dominance was 
even apparent in the families studied. 
Hypothesis 3 examinei familial corxiitions that were expected to 
stimulate intense sibli.rr} riva.J.cy. Families composed of parents who were 
nearly equal in power but who did not have a st.rorq parental coalition 
were predicted to afford the siblin;s coalition opportunities. In these 
families, sibli.rr} riva.J.cy would be intense and bitter as children 
c:xnnpetei amorg themselves for shifting coalition opportunities. 'Ihe data 
failed to support this hypothesis. However, there was no evidence to 
support the predominance of parent-child coalitions 011er ch.il.d-ch.ild 
coalitions. 
S:iblin;J conflict and intense rivalries typically stem from what 
Romans' (1961) exc:harge theo:cy referred to as perceptions of distributive 
injustice. Under these coniitions, the redress behavior on the part of 
the chlld will manifest itself in the form of guilt, an;er, tattlin;J arxi 
coalition formation. Ihin;er (1975) proposed that if parents referee 
oonflict situations between children aooordi.rg to rules or principles 
consistent from situation to situation, then there will be less conflict 
in the siblirq relationship. Unfortunately, no measure of parental 
referee behavior was included in this study. A possilile proxy for this 
variable might be the extensive use of the groop consensus decision-
maki.n:J mode employEd by families in the experimental decision-makirg 
game. Parents who seek to reach consensus in family decision-makin;J may, 
in fact, be mana.gin] conflict arxi working to re:iuce arrt perceptions of 
distr.il::utive injustice among the siblin;Js. 'Ibis attempt by the parents 
to minimize siblin;s' perceptions of unfaimess in family situations 
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might also result in a reduction in the frequency of coalition formation. 
Also, the directions for the decision-makin; game might have influenced 
family patterns in that families were told to reaC'h a family decision. 
It might be interestin;J to compare the fi.n::iin;Js from this study with 
f:iniin;Js from a different experimental situation in whiC'h competition was 
encouraged :by d.i.rect.in;J the family members to maximize self-interest. 
Hypotheses 4 am 5 examined si:.tuctural variables within the sibling 
pair. Age am sex differences in the siblin; pair were predicted to have 
implications for the st.t'eD;Jth of coalitions between the sibl.in;Js. 
Specifically, stron;Jer coalitions were expected to be more likely to form 
between same-sex siblirgs than between opposite-sex siblin;s. Also, 
st:rorger coalitions were expected to be more likely to form between 
siblirv3s who were closer as opposai to more distant in age. Practically 
spea}d.rx], same-sex siblin;J coalitions were slightly larger than opposite-
sex siblin;J coalitions, but no statistical significance was fourd between 
the two groups. 'nle test for the relationship between age differences in 
the siblirq pair am the stren;th of the siblin;J coalition showed no 
relationship between these two variables. 
Gerst! (1956) attempted to test Caplow•s (1956) original model of 
coalitions in a triad by smveyi.nq 50 siblin; triads. All siblin;Js were 
asked to reconstruct retrospectively varicus aspects of their siblin;J 
subsystem. Of the 50 triads, 23 were found to contain coalitions 
verified by the separate reports of all three siblin]s. In that study, 
all rut two were coalitions of same-sex siblin;Js. 'Ihe age difference 
between coalition partners was considerably less than between siblin;s 
who did oot form coalitions. Siblirq coalitions~ to be based on 
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similarity of sex, age, am interest rather than on the balance of power 
in the triaC. 'Ihe f.iniin:;Js from Gerstl's study raise an interestin:j 
point about the present study. In Gerstl's study there were triads of 
siblin;s, which offered some options about choice of coalition partner. 
Clearly there was greater variation in age and sex of potential partners 
than in the p:resent study. In the present study a siblin;J could only 
choose whether or not to enter a siblin:] coalition, as no choice for 
partners was available. 
Bonacich, Grusky and Peyrot (!:381), in their test of caplow's (1968) 
theory, foun:l no significant differences in age or sex effects on siblirg 
coalition~ 'Ihis finiing, however, was related to the fact that 
children in their study did not show a ten:iency to support each other in 
disputes. Bonacic:h et al.'s study, like Gerstl1s (1956) study, involved 
retrospective reporti.n;J of coalition behavior as opposed to the direct 
observation approach employed in the present study. 
Hypothesis 6 examined the major assumption of Bonacich, Grusky arxi 
Peyrot's (1981) status maintenance theory. It was posited that the 
falnily was composed of a hierarchical power chain with F>M>C4>C3. 'Ihis 
organizational stJ:ucture was, according to the theory, maintained by all 
falnily members by virtue of their givi.rq strorx]er support to the higher 
status family member in a conflictual decision-maki.n;J situation. only 
partial support was foun:i for this hypothesis. Parents received 
significantly more support than children received. Mother received 
slightly more support than father; father received more support than 
older child; arxl older child received slightly more support than youn;rer 
child received. 'Ihese fin:iirgs are consistent with Bonacich et al.'s 
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results in their own "testilY;1 of the theoey. Coalition patterns appear to 
maintain power differences between parents am children. 
Bonachich, Grusky ard Peyrot (1981) posited that sta:b.Js maintenance 
theoey provides an alternative intel:p:retation of the greater exp:ressivity 
of mothers, an explanation unrelated to Parsons' am Bales' (1955) 
assumption of an incompatibility between instrumental ani mcpressive 
roles in families. Expressive behavior counteracts group tensions that 
arise from goal-directed hierarchically organized activities. Expressive 
leaders promote equality ani they are well-liked. status maintenance 
theory implies that the typically less powerful mother will have a more 
mcpressive role than the father. To the extent that receivi.n; support 
can be identified with bei.n; lilted, then the mother can be considered an 
~:ressive specialist in this sense. Mothers in the present study 
received more support than any other family member (a fin:iin;J also true 
in Bonacich. et al.'s empirical study). An interesti.n; note, although 
CR.Itcome was not the focus of this study, was that in 11 out of 24 
families the mothers' suggestions for resolvin;J the decision prevaile:i in 
the final analysis. 
Examination of the Usefulness of the 'lbeoretical Models 
'!his study attempted to test social-psychological theories of 
coalition formation originally derive:i to explain ard predict the 
behavior of i.n:iividuals in small ad hoc experimental groups. 'lbe 
methodology which has been developed to experiment with il'Xiividuals an:i 
with artificial groups does not apply directly to the measurement of 
typical patterns of an ~izx3 system. Haley (1962) argued that there 
are marked differerx:es between family experiments arxi small group 
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experiments. In the small group experiment a situation is arran;Jed for 
several unrelated people an:i measurement is taken of the effect of that 
context on their behavior. In the family experiment the problem is to 
measure how members of a group with a histo:cy typically resporv:i to each 
other, while attemptj.n; to eliminate as much as possible the effect of 
that particular sett.in;J on their performance. Haley ~ that some 
adaptation of small group theo:ty an:l methodology might be possible for 
family experimentation: however, it would seem that measurement of even 
quite rigid am crude patterns in a particular family might differ 
markedly from the effect of different contexts on unrelated people who 
have been placed in them. 
'!he two coalition theories tested in this study provided a rather 
sbnplistic set of asSUlllptions arxi predictions about the behavior of 
i.rxiividuals in a given context. 'Ihe issue of family histocy, not to 
mention the future that the family group shared (unlike the ad hoc 
gn:rup), could easily have influenced the behavior of inti vidual ~;roup 
members in muc::h more highly complex ways than the theories proposed. 
Power as measured by il'Xlicators derived from small group interaction 
was not foun:i to be strcr¥:Jly related to the authority structure of the 
family in the hypothesized manner. '!his in:licates a well-known 
difference in the quality of interaction between family melt'lbers arxi 
unrelated members of ad hoc experimental groups. Scott (1962) noted that 
the family "cares" for the powerless in:lividual. 'Ihe so-called powerless 
member of the family often does not feel as powerless in the family group 
as a person in a similar lowly power position feels in other groups. 
Also, the balance of power in the family group may be more susoept.ible to 
variations stimulated by the severity of consequences related to the 
experimental task. 
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The primary focus of the present study was to examine some of the 
causes and consequences of family coalitions in intact, nonclinical 
families. All types of coalitions were identified in this sample, but 
conservative coalitions between members of equal status (i.e., parent-
parent and child-child) predominated. The systematic consequences of 
various types of coalitional patterns have been described, but the 
consequences for the individual remain the subject for future 
investigations. 'lhe present study takes a first step in that direction 
by describing coalition dynamics in nonclinical families. This would 
seem to be a prerequisite to understanding what types of coalition 
behaviors are "pathological" and have detrimental effects on child 
developm:mt. 
Methodological Issues, Strengths, arxl Linri.tations 
Another purpose of this research was to develop a reliable ani valid 
measure of coalitions in families an:1 to develop a decision-maki.rq game 
which wc:uld simulate family decision-mak:i.n:l patterns in the laboratory. 
'Ihe game prove:i useful in simulating a decisionin;r event for the 
families. However, the results of the correlational analyses to assess 
the levels of validity ani reliability of the measures employe:i in the 
study prove:i to shed considerable dOllbt on the internal validity of the 
testirg of tbeoretical predictions about the relationships between 
variables. 
In the final analysis, the suspect results of the theory testin;J 
bec:x)me far less im:portant than the researcher's attempt to develop a 
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reliable am valid measure of the construct, family coalitions. 'Ihe lack 
of convergence between the researcher's measure of coalitions and other 
measures of coalitons suggests that simple frequency counts of supportive 
acts between family members somehow do not capture the complexity of the 
constl::uct. It does however provide data for other family researchers who 
might otherwise have used Bonacich et al.'s (1981) construct for 
investigatin;J family coalition formation. I'\lrthermore, the results of 
the analyses may provide a base upon which other researchers can begin to 
develop a construct that is sufficiently complex to represent the 
interxie1 theoretical notion of family coalitions. 
'!his study has taken a first step in moving the investigation of 
family power beyord the husband-wife dyad. COllective power dynamics 
were examined by observin;;J all family members as they erqciged in a 
decisionin] event. Whether the behavior observed can be labeled 
"coalitions" legitimately or not, there was clear evidence of active 
allldren influenced the final outcome of the decisionin;J tl1rough the 
exercise of irxlividual power ani through joint persuasive efforts with 
other family members. 
'Ihe gatherll:q of self-report and observational data provided both an 
"insider's" ani an "outsider's" view of family dec:ision-makin:;J pl"""Cesses. 
'!his combination of information may serve to expan:i theoretical models of 
family decision-mak:i.n;J. Also, the sampling of a nonclinical family 
population may provide a benchmark for comparisons with distressed 
families. 
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'Ibere were a I1Ultll:ler of threats to the internal arxi extemal validity 
of the study. '1lle situational-specific nature of the sirgle session or 
sin;Jle-observation experimental task raises issues of reliability ani 
general.izability to the everyday pattems of decision maki.n:] which occur 
in families. Epstein (1980) noted that this is a problem for behavioral 
research in general. In defense of the sin;Jle-session experiment, 
Epstein cu:gued that they can be of value by stimulatirg other studies ani 
by contributi.n;J to a pop.llation of studies that can ultimately be 
interpreted in the aggle:Jate. Epstein's point is particularly salient 
when the researcher is embarking upon uncharted areas of investigation 
such as collective power dynamics in families. 
Epstein (1980) also noted that data derived from sin;Jle-observation 
experiments often produce few statistically significant relationships, 
ani amorq these few there is often a lack of coherence. When data are 
aggregated over an i.ncreasirg l'lUlllber of events, the stan:iard deviations 
decrease, demonstratirg that the high starx:lard. deviations from the 
si.n:;rle-observation experiment are the result of error of measurement 
(i.e., transient factors unrelated to the phenomenon beirg investigated). 
'lherefore, one unavoidable conclusion is that the measure of the 
laboratory behavior itself was possibly unreliable ani as a result 
incapable of establi.shin] stron; relationships. 'lhe situational 
uni.qpeness of the sirgle-observation experiment may preclude the 
establishment of reliable generalizations that hold even in the most 
minor variations in the situation. 
'!he consistency of a set of measurements may be a.wroached from two 
somewhat different viewpoints of intraindividual and interindividual 
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variability. Only interindividual variability was examined in this 
study. Two parallel measures of family coalitions were obtained am the 
correlation between the two sets of scores served as a more or less 
direct imex of the consistency of the measurements. '!he importance of 
this type of reliability assessment was diminished somewhat by the lack 
of availability of two extemal raters who were unaware of the hypotheses 
being tested and the research questions. However, the method of 
reliability assessment used in this study did provide evidence of the 
extent to which the measure of family coalitions set objective criteria 
for another experimenter to follow. Future research should involve 
ratings of the videotapes by two independent raters. Also, 
intrain:iividual variability in the consistency of measurements should be 
examined through a set of repeated measurements by two independent 
raters. 
Another potentially limitin;J aspect of the study was its relatively 
simple design. 'Ihe study attempted to address complex family processes 
through a simple design that is easily replicated am cost-efficient. 
'lhis aspect of the research is critical when the researcher is operati.n;J 
without ~ or with limited financial support. Fi.n:iin;r.; from a study 
such as this one should pique the interests of ~ agencies am allow 
for the developiOOnt of mre canplex studies in the future. 
A methodological problem of this study ani previous investigations 
of coalitions in families is the way in which coalitions have been 
measured. No studies were identified which reported any determination of 
oonstruct validity. For this research, the operational definition of a 
coalition derived by Bonacich, G:rusky arxi Peyrot (1981) was adapted. 
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coalitions were measured as a proportion (i.e., the frequency of 
supportive statements or acts made by two family members to each other 
compared to the total number of supportive statements made by the family 
in the experimental decision-maki.n; game). Several measures of 
coalitions were made am their degrees of association with the primru:y 
definition of the construct were computed. 
'Ihe relatively weak strength of the correlations between the various 
indices of coalitions is not unusual in family measurement research. 
Miller, Rollins and Thomas (1982) noted that the few attempts to find 
support for convergent validity of single constructs using multiple 
methods have been unsuccessful. 'Ihey reported that convergent validity 
within two behavioral observation methods or within two self-report 
methods has shown the best results in other studies. 
One method was to compare a counting technique with a global 
technique. In the present study, the behavioral observations of two 
raters showed rather low levels of association. 'Ibis firrli.ng might be 
related to the different levels of conceptualization employed by each 
observer. The medical student rater was rating family supportiveness 
(i.e., specific behavioral acts), while the expert rater was making 
global assessments of the overall stren;th of a coalition type. 
Another method was to compare the results of countirq supportive 
statements or acts to determine coalitions with self-report responses by 
family members about who supported whom. 'Ihe low levels of association 
fOUDi between observational ani self-report data in this study are not 
uncommon to family measurement research. Olson {1977) has attributed 
these low levels of association to the fact that two different domains 
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are beirg tapped. Self-reports, he cont.en::ls, are an "insider's view'' 
(i.e., a subjective measure of relationships) while behavioral 
observations are an "outsider's view'' (i.e., a more objective measure of 
relationships). Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect them to coincide. 
Rather than givin;J preference to either self-report or behavioral 
measures, Olson encouraged the expansion of our theoretical models 
through the utilization of data from l::loth an insider's am an outsider's 
frame of reference. 
'Ihe size of the sample (24 families) am the selection process 
(i.e., a replictated systematic ramom sample from two elementaJ:y schools 
in central North carolina) created a :rn.nnber of concerns. Limitations in 
the qeneralizability of the fird.in;r-; are obvious. 'Ihe small sample size 
precluded certain statistical analyses arxi contributed to the lack of 
statistically significant results found in some of the analyses that were 
perfonned. Even if the sample size had been 30 families as originally 
planned, this situation would have been in'potved only slightly. 
'Ihe rather low participation rate sheds reasonable doubt on the 
randomness of the sample am the external validity of this research. 
Families who agreed to participate might differ markedly from those who 
refused. For example, a family havin; difficulty between members would 
doubtfully come in to p.It their difficulties on public display. It would 
seem illogical to assume homogeneity amon:;J the nonclinical families. 
Actually a nonclinical sample includes a variety of types of families 
rather than a sin;le ''nonclinical" type. 'Ihe self-selection factor in 
the sample am the one-time measure of coalition formation makes 
generalizations about the results questionable. 
93 
A st:rergt:h an:i a weakness of the present study was its investigation 
of the whole family ani its use of multiple sources of information about 
the family. cromwell ani olson (1975) argued that marriage and family 
researchers would benefit both methodologically ani theoretically by 
gatherin;J data from more than one family member. Increased reliability 
ani validity as well as greater insight into family function were 
presented as potential benefits. Miller, ~llins arxi 'Ihomas (1982) 
argued that the potential benefits of measurin;J multiple family meml:>ers 
must be weighe:i against the problems created at the data analysis stage. 
However, researchers working with data sets from multiple family members 
struggle with serious problems resultin;r from analyzin:l data from 
correlated measures. 
In the present study, data sets included responses of father, 
mother, older child, and younger child. 'Ibe family is the samplin;r unit 
but what is the unit of analysis? In this study dyadic behavior was 
examined arxi then aggtegated at the level of parent, parent-child arxi 
siblirq coalitions. 'lhis approach to data analysis created problems of 
statistical t.estirq ani inferences based on the given population. 
Another problem emerged when the researcher attempted to use data f:rom 
more than one family member simultaneously. 'Ihe issue of 
multioollinearity of measures precluded the use of some traditional 
correlational analyses. 
Implications for :ruture Research 
Many of the suggestions for future research flow from the 
limitations disrussed above. Epstein (1980) dismssed an effective 
pJ:co:odnre for reducin;J the situational specificity of fimin:Js from a 
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sin;le-observation ~iment. His suggestion for a procedure would also 
increase the potential for replicability ani the generalizability of the 
fin:iin;Js. Epstein recommerxled COl'lductin;J elq)eriments in which data are 
averaged aver stimuli, situations, an:Vor occasions. A proceduJ:e in 
which behavior is sampled aver stimuli ani occasions permits 
replicability ani generalizal::>ility to be assessed ani taken into account 
in interpreting the fin:tin;Js from a particular study ani in planni.rg 
further studies. 
'!be use of causal path analysis (l?roc:tor, 1987) ani Joreskog's ani 
somom•s LISREL (1978) can be helpful in future research, as problems of 
correlated measures appear to be inherent in the analysis of data from 
multiple family members. Confirmatory factor analysis ani structural 
equation models are specifically designed to allow for correlated 
measures. '!he researcher can identify specific measures that share 
common method variance ani analyze accordingly. A more fully developed 
model of the whole family could be tested, rather than havirq to resort 
to data analysis carried out at the level of dyadic relations. (see 
Miller, Rollins ani 'Ihomas, 1982, for a detailed disrnssion of 
measurement from multiple family members.) 
More attention shalld be given to the salience of the experimental 
task in future research. In a low risk hyp:Jthetical game-like task, 
parents may be less likely to exert the types of power strategies they 
would employ in more serious decision.inq arenas. For example, in 
decisions about the expen:titure of large sums of money, children might 
have considerably less voice than in decisions about the use of free 
tilne. Also, to vary the decision.inq arenas investigated would strel"gthen 
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the generalizability of the f~. 'Ib the extent that a "real" 
decision can be examinei (e.g., actually givin; the family $100.00 or 
$500.00 to decide how it would be use:i), this would increase the 
relevance of the task an:i pethaps more closely simulate typical patterns 
of decision-mak:i.n;; in the family. 
Future reseaJ:dl in this area must address the complex issue of 
coalitions that are larger than the dyad. Clearly, family members 
jointly use resc::JUI"CeS in triads ard in larger units in families with more 
than four members. When analyzing the full rarge of possible 
combinations in a family of four members, there are conceptually hW'Xlreds 
of possible units of analyses. More sophisticated mathematical models 
may be require:i for a complete analysis of coalitional precesses. 
E\lrther examination of the conceptualization arrl measurement of 
coalition formation is clearly in:iicatOO. Within the context of power 
dynamics, coalition fonnation implies opposition or the presence of 
ccnflict. SUpportive statements of family members can be considered 
in:licators of coalition fonnation only after at least one of the family 
meml:lers has e.>epressed an opposjn; viewpoint. It is iinportant to test out 
this proposed differentiation between agreement and coalition formation. 
Future :resean:::h oould compare family members' alliances prior to ani 
after the opposirq viewpoint has been expressed. To establish the 
theoretical significance of a distinction between agreement ard coalition 
formation, research could examine whether members switch alliances after 
opposition, drop rut of the discussion, or chan:]e their prior position. 
Coalition formation is a process, and its analysis~ process 
data such as sequential analyses. 'Ib fully un::1erstan:l coalition 
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processes, the researcher need not only ask: Who supports whom? It is 
also necesscu:y to ask: Who coalesces against whom? In other words, 
whether and which coalitions form may depend on which family member 
introducEd the initial PLoposal am which family member intrcduced the 
O,RX)Sin;J viewpoint into the discussion. Family members also may charx]e 
their alliances durin; one decision task. In order to advance the 
knowledge base on family power, researchers will have to develop 
concepts and measures that do justice to the complexity and processual 
nature of family power dynamics. 
Further comparisons of the measure of family coalitions with 
standardized measures such as the Beavers-Timberlawn Family Evaluation 
Scale (Iewis, Beavers, Gossett, & Ihillips, 1976), which has a family 
coalition component, might shed additional light on the construct 
validity of the measure used in this study. 'Ihe availability of the 
videotaped family interactions from this study allows for multiple 
ratin.;Js of the silnUlated decisionin;J event. 
FUture investigations of collective power dynamics in families 
shc:W.d shift the context for eJq:~erimentation from the laboratory to the 
home. '!be greater availability of technolo;ically sophisticated video 
equipment and the familiarity of many families with videotapin] equipment 
may create a situation in which actual decisi~ events coold be taped 
in an 1Jl'll:::btrusive manner in the home. Certainly the availability of 
repeated measures across different decisionin;J areas and over tilne would 
provide a more comprehensive picture of the coalitional patterns in 
families. 
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to tap the more phenomenological aspects of coalition formation. 'lbat is, 
family members would be asked to view segments of the videotapes am to 
recall what they were thi.nk:i.n;J ani feelin; at a given point in time. 
Family members might also become raters of their own coalitions by viewing 
the videotape ani rating their decisionin] event. Multiple 
operatianalizations of the construct of family coalitions ani multiple 
measurements would enhance the possibility of triargula~ on the 
referent am ultimately pro:iucinl a valid ani reliable measure of family 
coalitions. 
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SAMPLE CHARACI'ERISTICS OF ALL 62 FAMILIES (PARENI'S) 
Men (N=62) Wcmm (N=62) 
Cllaracteristic MFAN SD Ran;e MFAN SD Range 
Age 38.9 6.0 28-54 36.4 4.8 27-48 
Education 14.5 LO 10-22 13.7 .8 9-18 
Inc::aDe 29-31 7-50+ 9-11 0-37 
(ran;Je in (median) (median) 
thousarxls) 
Years Married 16 9-23 16 9-23 
(median) (JIEdian) 
Hours Worked 50.7 10.8 38-99 36.5 9.8 10-54 
Per Week 
Race 
Black 24.2% 24.2% 
White 74.2% 74.2% 
other 1.6% 1.6% 
COUnty of Residence 
Durham 45.2% 45.2% 
Wake 54.8% 54.8% 
Times Married 
one 90.2% 93.4% 
Two 9.8% 6.6% 
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF ALL 62 FAMILIES (CHILDREN) 
CharaLteristic C3 Youngest Child (N=62) 
Age 
Sex 
Male 
Fanale 
CharacteristiL 
Age 
sex 
Male 
Fanale 
!:! or % SD Range 
6.7 
47.5% 
52.5% 
C6 (N = 3) 
!:! m- % 
--
14.0 
66.7% 
33.3% 
3.3 1-12 
SD Range 
6.1 10-21 
C4 (N=56) 
M or % SD 
10.4 
46.4% 
53.6% 
3.5 
Range 
5-17 
C7 Oldest Child (N=l) 
M or% SD Range 
11.0 --- 11 
0.0% 
100.0% 
CS (N=23) 
M or % SD 
11.3 
43.5% 
56.5% 
4.4 
Range 
6-23 
...... 
0 
0'1 
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North Carolina State University 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
Social Worlc Pro.,_ 
Depanmont of Socioio«)· and Anthropology 
Box 8107 Zip 27685-8107 
(919) 737-32111 
Dear Parent: 
''The American family is changing." You have probably heard this said as 
often as we have. Like us, do you wonder what kind of changes really are 
occurring and what they might mean for families like yours? 
As a group of health professionals who study anci work with families, we 
are asking families to help us answer these questions. We have imp:>rtant 
things to learn from all kinds of families, but right now we want to talk just 
with two-parent families--about how they make decisions, how parents and 
children communicate with each other, how parents deal with the stress of 
raising a family in today's changing world. 
The Director of Research for Durham County Schools has given us your 
name, address, and phone number for the purpose of this study. Any participa-
tion from here on will take place only if your family agrees to it. To be 
elig1ble, your child must be in the 6-12 age group and must be presently 
living with both natural parents. 
Families who agree to participate will come in for a single interview at 
a site in Raleigh or Chapel Hill. Both parents and all children in the family 
will be included. The interview session will last about 2-1/2 hours. 
Family members will be asked to fill out some questionnaires and to 
provide some background info~ation. They will also be videotaped while 
playing games together. Families will be paid $10 for their time. After the 
study has ended, we will also send each family a summary of our discoveries 
about the various ways families cope with the pressures of living in the 
1980s. 
A member of our staff will be calling you sometime during the next few 
weeks to tell you more about our study. we will be glad to answer any ques-
tions you might have at that time. we sincerely hope that you w1ll be willing 
to share your knowledge and experience of your family with us. 
Sincerely, 
Nancy J. warren, Ph.D. Eleanor R. llgen, M.s.w. 
University of N. c. Medical School 
966-3377 966-2023 
J. S. Toby Brown, M.S.W. 
N, c. State University 
737-3291 
North Carolin• Sratr Univtrtfty JJ a LAn~I..Crant Unrvrrs1ty anti 111 conttftwrnt 1nshtwf10n of Thr UnivrrJII'y of North Caro/1na 
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-\ ;, North Carolina State University ·. 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
. 
Social Work Program 
Department of Sociology and Anthropology 
Bo• 8107 Zip 27695-8107 
(919)737-:1291 
~--------------------
'Ihank yoo for agreei.n; to participate in the research project on family 
interactions. If yoo will fill em. the enclcsai forms it will speed t:hin;s up 
in rur session an • I have clearly marked 
the forms husbarrl arxi w1fe for yoor ccnven1erre. Please read the direcions 
carefully and hll out the forms completely and bring them with you to the 
sc:heduled session. 'lhank yoo in advmla! for yoor c:ooperation. 
S.ira!rely I 
James s. (Tc:tly) ~ 
Assistant Professor 
Olec:kl.ist of ~ _!e Cl:lrplete ani ~ to the Session 
Fmnily Environment Scale ucther father 
Life EXperiences ~ 
~~~~Behavior 
~the~ 
session Location: North carolina Memorial Hospital 
Main ID:by 
Manninq Drive 
Cl1apel Hill I NC 
father 
father 
Note: Please call if you are unable to make the a~int!Ent: Work 737-3291 
Hane 834-4931 
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APPENDIX D 
CONSENr FORl-1 FOR PARriCIPATING SOBJECI'S 
CONSENT FORM 
Interaction Patterns of Normal Families 
I agree for myself and my child (ten) to 
participate in a research study entitled "Interaction Patterns of Nor:nal 
Families." I understand that the study has two goals. One is to learn more 
about the interaction patterns of normal healthy families and the other is to 
evaluate a relatively new measure of family interaction patterns called the 
Family Interaction Rating system. 
I understand that I will participate in one thirty-minute observed and video-
taped session playing with my child(renl using building blocks and Chinese 
Checkers, and discussing a family decision; and will be given paper and pencil 
questionnaires to assess my perceptions of my child's behaviors (Eyberg Child 
Behavior Inventory), my attitudes about parenting (Parent Questionnaire), and 
my perceptions of our family (FES). Further, my children will be observed and 
videotaped playing with me, and answer questions about their views of 
themselves and the family (Self observation scales, FES, Perception of your 
Parents, and Family Drawing). In addition, if you consent, the school(s) 
which my child attends will be asked to fill out a questionnaire regarding my 
child's functioning in school. r understand that all these procedures are 
experimental, and not used for clinical evaluation or assessment of families. 
I understand that approximately 60 families will participate in the study. 
I understand that aft.:r I complete the play task and the questionnaires, my 
family and I will receive $10.00 in exchange for our time. I do not expect 
any other direct personal benefit for myself and my family from participation. 
I understand that the information gained from the videotape session will be 
used to evaluate the reliability and validity of the Family Interaction Rating 
System, and to increase scientific knowledge about the ways ordinary families 
play and interact together. Although it is not possible to foresee all 
possible risks, no physical and emotional risks are expected from these 
procedures. r understand that the only persons who will see the test 
materials are those involved directly in the research (Principal Investigator 
and Research Assistants). All videotapes and records will be given code 
n\JIIbers and kept locked within the hospital. 
I understand that Nancy J. warren, Ph.D. (919/966-3377) is directly 
responsible for this project. Should I have any questions or complaints, she 
may be contacted at any time. I also understand that I am free to withdraw 
from the study at any time. I understand that this study has been approved by 
the Committee on the Protection of Human Subjects of the school of Medicine of 
the University of North CArolina. If I feel there has been any infringement 
of my child's or family's rights, I may contact the chairman of the Committee 
on the Protection of the Rights of Human Subjects, John c. Herion, M.D. at 
(919/966-1344). I understand that in the event of physical injury directly 
resulting from the research procedures, financial compensation cannot be made. 
However, every effort will be made to make available to me the facilities and 
professional skills of the University of North carolina at Chapel Hill. 
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I understand that the facilities of Wake Teen Medical services, Inc. have been 
made available for the purposes of this research study. However, Wake Teen 
Medical Services, Inc. is in no way involved in the actual research project. 
Therefore, I agree to hold Wake Teen Medical services, Inc. harmless in the 
event of any infringement of my child's or family's rights. 
I agree to participate in this study on family interactions. 
Parent: -----------------------------------Da~: 
Parent: 
--------------------------------- Date: 
Children: __________________ Da~: --------
Witness: -------------------Date: --------
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Family ID 1. ____ _ 
Fanily Manber Age. ____ _ 
Sex'------
Decision-Making Game: Preteoo, for a moment, that I had $100.00 which 
I could give to you and your family to do with as you please. The 
on~ y thing is that all of you would have to decide together how your 
family would use the $100.00. You and your family could do anything 
you wanted to with the money. You could use it for fun activities or 
you could use it to pay for something your family wants or needs. 
Your family could choose to use it together or choose to divide it. 
FOr the next 10 minutes, please discuss and make a decision about 
row you would use the $100.00. I will let you know when 5 minutes, 8 
minutes, and 9 minutes have gone by. I will stop you at the end of 
the 10 minutes: 
1. What do I want the fanily to do with the $100.00? 
2. Which person or persons can I count on to side with me or can I 
talk into going along with my idea for using the $100.00? 
Dad 
Sister 
Brother 
No one 
3. Which one person do you think is most likely to get his or her way 
or to have the most influence (power) in the decision about row to 
use the $100.00? 
Dad 
Sister 
Brother 
I will get my way __ _ 
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APPENDIX F 
Family IDt 
F~~nily Mauber :.ge -----
Sex ___ _ 
Decision-Hakiag Gillie: Poll01f:UP QueStionnaire 
Thinking about the Decision-Making Game you plated in the last 10 
minutes of the videotaping today/tonight, please answer the following 
questions: 
1. Which family members joined together or took sides with each other 
in an attempt to get their way about how the money would be used 
by the family? 
mother & father __ mother & younger child __ father & younger child __ 
mother & older child father & older child __ children together __ _ 
o~r _____________________________________________ _ 
2. Are these "teams" or persons siding together the typic31 or usual ways 
that people act in your family when trying to make a decision? 
Yes__ No__ Other __________________ _ 
3. Did your family act the way it does most of the time in trying to decide 
row to use the rooney? 
Yes __ No__ Other __________________ _ 
4. Think about what you said you wanted to do with the money before the 
game started. How mu::h of what you wanted would you say you got as a 
result of the discussion? 
0 
None of 
what I 
wanted 
1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
All of 
what I 
wanted 
5. All things considered, how.£!!!. would you say the decision was? 
0 1 
caapletely 
unfair 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
canpletely 
fair 
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JOI 
DATE:::::::::::::::::::: 
FAMILY INTERACTION STUDY 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
MOTHER 
l. Whet is your ng~ now? _______________________ _ 
2. When w~r~ you born? _________________________ _ 
Mo. Dey Yr. 
FATHER 
~- Whet is your pr~sent eg~?--------------------
4. And when were you born 7 _____________________ _ 
Mo. Day Yr. 
MOTHER 
5. How far did you go in school? [Gr.t sp~r1fir grade.] _______________________________ _ 
FATHER 
6. How fer did you go in •chool? ________________________ _ 
BOTH 
7. When did you get married? ______________________ _ 
Mo. Day Yr. 
7a. Is this your first marriage? Mothr.r ______ _ FAthrr _______ _ 
Explain: 
a. Bow lont were you eneaged before you got married? ____ _ 
9. How lont did you date before you got married? _________ _ 
10. How long did you know each othPr bPfore you detina? ____________________ _ 
MUJittli 
11. Which of the following racial or ~thnic groups do you 
consider you belong to? 
e. Caucasian, non-Hispanic 
b. ·Bleck, non-Hispanic 
c. AmPrican Indian 
d. Hisp'lnic 
~. Olh~r [identify] _________________ _ 
FATHER 
12. Which of these groups do you consider you belong to? 
a. Caucasian, non-Hispanic 
b. Rlack, non-Hisp<Jnic 
c. American Indian 
d. Hispanic 
e. Other [id~nlify] _____________ ~-----------
MOTHER 
13. What part of the United States [or world) did you grow 
up in?-----------------------------------------
FATHER 
14. What part did you grow up in? __________________________ _ 
MOTHER 
15. Do you consider the place where you grew up as urban, 
auburban, or rural? Indicate your answer on this 
acale: RURA~ URBAN i------------2 __________ 3 __________ 4 _________ 5 
FATHER 
16. How about you? RURAL 11RRAN 
.· 
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liOlH 
BOTH 
17. What kind of area do you live in now? 
RURAL URBAt\ 
18. Do you live in a single-family hnus~. multi-family 
house (for ex., a duplex), an apartm~nt, or a condorui-
niulll? -------------------------- ..... -------- ---·----- ·- --
19. Do you own ~r rent?----------------------------------
20. How long have you lived at your pr~sent adrlres~? ____ _ 
-------------~---------------------------p-----------
21. How many people live in your household? 
_________________ adults and _______________ ch1ldrP.n 
22. Docs anyone who is not ~ 111embrr of your imm~rij~t~ 
family l1ve in your household? If so, who 1s it? 
--------------------------------------------------··---
23. Does any •ember of your immediate fa111ily not l1ve at 
home with you? Please explein·-----------------------
------------------------------------------------------
24. When were your child(ren) born? (month, date, year) 
Youngest __________________ _ 
Next ______________________ _ 
Ne~t-----------------------
Next ______________________ _ 
Next ______________________ _ 
WORK. WORK HISTORY AND CHILD CARE 
MOTHER 
25. What type of work do you do (ask('d to the moth~>r 1" 
Job title, descrirtion of th~ work. 
26. How a11ny hou.~s per week ere you wC\rk i ng for pay? 
27. What hours do you work? 
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<:b. Huw long heve you had this joi.J 7 
29. What type of job did you heve before that? 
30. How did you decide to take the job you hev~ no~ 7 
31. How does your work affe~t the femily/ the children? 
32. Do you feel that the f~mi ly ben~fit~ or suffers from your 
job? 
benefits ·---------· --------·--··--·-··-----------·---------suffers 
:---------------:-------------:--------------:------------: 
5 4 3 
33. Ar~ you happy with your current wor~ arrangecen\R, or 
would you lik .. to chanr.e anything ahout your job, hours, 
pay, or stetus·~ 
very hapvy 
5 4 3 2 
very unhappy 
l ---- ·-----------: __ ... ______ ----:--------------:------------ ---
FATR£R 
34. What type of work do you do (osked to the father ) ? 
Job lith•, description of the work. 
35. How many hours per week are you working for pay? 
36. What hours do you work? 
37. How long have you had this job? 
38. What type of job did you have before that? 
39. Row did you decide to take the job you have now? 
40. How does your work effect the family/ the children 7 
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41. Do you feel that the family benefits or suffers from your 
job? 
benefits ~;----------------------------------------------s~~!. rs 
:--------~----·--:------------- ---~----------:---------
5 4 3 2 
42. Ar~ you happy with your rurrent ~ork arrangements, or ~ould 
you likr to r.hanr.•· onylhinP. abuut your job, hnurs, r:oy, or 
~I at us·~ 
very huppy 
:--------------:-------------:--------------:-------------: 
4 3 2 
ROTH 
JNC:OMF:: lf you feed comforlabl.- t .. JJinc us, ..,,.'rl lih· to 
kno~ how much ead• of you mal;e bf'fon• taxP!'i. Look on thP card 
Rnrl givP numt.Pr· whir.h fits th" amount uf your income (you ran use 
the we .. kly, monthly or yearly column whir.hever is easier). 
INCOME SCALE: hAnd the cards to each parent 
43. Mother's income _____________________ _ 
44. Father's income _____________________ _ 
BOTH 
CHILD CARE: Who cares for your children when you ere 
at work? (asked to BOTH) 
45. During school year (if applicable): check all that apply 
eDd (et detaif"s 
--Befor~ school procram or care 
--After achool pro(rem 
--Dey cere center 
--Hom~ d~y care arrangements (in someon~ elsr's hom~) 
--Babysitter in your hom~ 
·· Ned ghbor 
--Friend 
·-RelHtive 
--Older sibling .· 
--Child ear~a for aelf 
--A eoabination of the above, depending on the day of 
week. Give apecifica. 
the 
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.,.,, IIUIJnv, thP summe-r Cif llpplil"llblc·): chrrJ.. 11ll thttt Rpply ulld 
gl!'t detaJ la 
--Recreational program 
--Dey camp (for example YMCA) 
--School progre~ 
.--Day carl!' center 
--Ro•e d11y care errengr.111ents (in someone else's hor•:j 
--Babysitter in your ho111e 
--Neighbor 
--Friend 
··-Relalivr 
--O)dPI' r;jb)ing 
--Child ceres for self 
--A combination of the above, depending on the dey of th~ 
week, or the aonth. Give specifics. 
47. Who cares for your children in th~ PV~ning nr nn weekend~ 
wh~n you ere away from 'hom~? 
--BAbysitter in your home 
--Day care center 
---Home day cere 
--Neighbor 
--Friend 
--RI!'lative 
--Older siblin11 
--Child cares for self 
48. How satisfied ere you with your child care? 
\'ery satisfied Not at all 
---------------:--···-------·----:-----------------=--------------: 
5 4 3 2 
49. Was arranging child cere a problem for you? 
Severe problem No problem 
:---------------:--------------:-----------------:-------------~ 
2 -·· 3 
HOUSEHOLD RESPONSIBILITY AND DIVISION or LABOR 
BOTH 
4 
50. Who takPs responsibility for sering th11t household 
chores are done? 
.· 
5 
51. What h11ppens when things don't grt done; who does them? 
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52. Do the children have chores? 
53. What does each child do? 
54. What happens when they don't do them? 
55. Is there An al ]owance given or p<~yau•nt for chnr,.s <Inn•· l•y 
the children'? A] lowau<:"eo Paymeut for •:hor·,.o; Non .. 
56. How are household jobs dividPd up? Who does what? 
Below is a list of common chores, or jobs which need to be 
done around the house. Please mark which member of the 
fa•ily usually does each job. Choose from the follow1ng 
answers: 
a) Wife alwAys or almost alway5 doP.~ the chore 
b) W1fe sometime~ and husband som~times 
c) Hushand Always or almost alwHys 
d) Child or children ususally do it 
e) Everyone does his or her own 
f) Someone outside the family paid to do it 
g) Not done in the family 
LIST OF CHORES 
--Cooking meals to be eaten at home 
--Setting the table 
--Cleaninr the table 
--Food shopping 
--Household repairs 
--Dusting 
--Strairhtenint up th~bouse 
--Washinr dishu 
--Dryinr dishes 
--Clean bathrooa 
.· 
--Clean ld tchen 
--Making lunches to go 
--Putting clothP.$ in t~e 
laundry hamper 
--Sweeping the floor 
--Mopping th~ floor 
--Raking the yard 
--Cutting the grass 
--Gardening 
--Tri•ming or pruning 
shrubs 
--Clf'ftninc out thr 
gutters on the house 
--Loading thP. dishwas~~r 
--Cleaning drawer~ und 
clos~ta 
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--to:t:-Oln& I! lid carP of pets 
--Washing and folding clothes 
--Ironing clothes 
--Pick in'4 Up toys or caaes 
--Paying bills 
--Taking car in for repDirs 
--Making repairs on the car 
--Washing the car 
--Preparing taxies 
--Making the beds 
FAMILY DECISION-MAKING 
BOTH 
n~Ei!i2n:~~hing: ~e would 
process of how families make 
the whole family. Phase 
questions. 
--Balancing the cht:'ckboak 
--Arranf!ing for 
beb)•s itt er 
likP to understand more about the 
decisions about issues that concern 
help us by answe.ring the following 
51. Please think about the lest time you had to mRke a dPcision 
about spending a large-;;~u~t-~f aonP.y for something like a 
car, television, refrigerator, etc. (don't count the tasli 
you just did). 
a) How was the decision aade? 
_. -~ 
Group consensus (ell feaily aeabr.rs having to agrer.) ___ _ 
Majority rule 
Parents' deciiio~ 
Children's decision--
Individual feaily .;;b;r decision 
Other 
------~~-----------------------------------------
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b) hho supported who11 in the d~cision·o~~al.iug? 
aother-fether ___ _ fathPr·older ch1ld 
aother-older child ___ _ father-youn(er child ___ _ 
•aother-youo(er 9hild ___ _ child-chilJ ___ _ 
other------------------------------------------------
5R. Plc11se think Rbout the Jest time you ltttd to IIIHkt• "tl•·•·ision 
abtJut onf' <1r t::nre of--yn~r--rhild•···n. IIP•·•s1u11s "'"'l'l 
children mi&:hl inr.lude such thin!!& as curfew tilllt:S, wh~,.., 
the child(rcn} .,;ill go to summer t:IIIIIJI, allowttnces, etC'. 
a} How w11s th~ decision made? 
Group consensus (ell family m<'mt. .. t·s h«liing to l!grc ... • ___ _ 
Majority rule · 
P11rents' deci;i~~ 
Children's decisi~~--
Indlviduel fo11ily m;;b;r decision 
Other-----------------------------------------------
b} Who supported whom in the decision-makin~? 
•other-father father-older child 
mother-older child father-younger child ___ _ 
•other-youn(er child ___ _ child-child 
other----------------------------------------
59. Please think about tbe lest ti•e you had to make a decision 
about chores that hed-to-be-done around the house (e.(. 
cutting the grass, doinl laundry, working on the c11r, 
preparing a meal, etc.) 
B) How Wft~ the derision 1111de? 
.· 
Group consensus (all family aembers havin( to acree) ___ _ 
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M••JOIIlY rUJP 
l'nrents • deci; on ___ _ 
Children's dec sion 
Individual faa ly aeabcr deciaion ___ _ 
Other---------------------------------------------
b) ·Who supported whoa in th~ decision-making? 
~nther-father ___ _ fath~r-oldP.r child 
aothcr-older child ___ _ flllh•·r-yuunF,cr chi It! ____ _ 
mothP.r-younger r.hild ___ _ r.hiltl·child 
other-------------------------------------
60. Please think about the !!!! !i!~ you had to aake a decision 
about how free tiae would be used. The use of free time 
aight include auch things as faaily vacation plans, a 
weekend outing, an evening outing, or individual family 
member' plans for free time .. 
a) How was the decision made? 
Group consensus (all family aembers having to agree) ___ _ 
Majority rule 
Parents' deci;I;~ 
Children's decisi~~--
Individual faaily ae;ber decision) ___ _ 
Other-------------------------------------------------
b) Who supported whom in the decision-aaking? 
aother-father ___ _ father-older child 
aothcr-older child ___ _ father-younger child ___ _ 
aotber-youD(er child ___ _ child-child ___ _ 
other_~~~---------------------------------------
FAMILY VALUES 
MOTHER 
6] • Were you rMi&cd in any particular religion? Jf so, what wn~ 
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it? _____________________________________________________________ _ 
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b:.!. How nctJv~ "'er~ you·and your fa11il>· in lhnt ~·hurt:h'' v.•r·y 
11ctivt-, aoder11t.ely active, so•ewhat act.ivP, not too ac1 Jvc, 
inactive. 
63. Do you attend church now? If eo, which? (Gel denomination 
retber then particular na•e.] 
64. How active are you and your .family in that church? vPry 
active, •oderetely active; ao.,ewhat active, not too '"I iV•~. 
1n11ctivP. 
F'ATIIER 
65. Were you raised in any p11rticuler religion? lf so, 
which?----------------------------------------------------------
66. How active were you and your faaily in that church? VPry 
active, 11oderately active, aome~o<het ar.tive, not too active, inaciJV<-
67. Do you at tend church now? If so, what dt•nomJnRtion IS 
it? 
--------~----------------------------------------------------
68. How active are you end your family in thHt church? very 
active, moderately active, some"'h3t actJve, not too a~liv~. 
inactive. 
MOTHER 
69. Row is your family different from the family you grew up ln'-
Differences can be things like wh~ther you work ur not, 
diff~rences in religious or political b~lief!<, wht'ther you w<•r•· 
rais~d on a fer11 or in the city, differenc~s in how you Ar<· 
raising your children, etc. 
70. How do you think that these differences will effect your 
children? 
71. Have there been any changes in your family sinr~ your 
children were born, such as changes in jobs, child .-ern, moth<'r 
working or nut working And thP likr? 
.· 
••· n t>u, ho• do you feel th1tt thesf' chances h11ve ~tffo·r-tl!d 
your children? 
73. What are your priaary values in child rearing? 
74. What do you really want to cive your childrf'n to pr.,pare 
the• for adult life? 
75. What are your mujor worries about or for your r.hildrf'n? 
FATHER 
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76. How is your :family different from th<• famllv you gr""' up in'' 
Differences can be things like the type of job you have, 
differences in religious or political beliefs, whP.ther you were 
raised on a farm or in the city, differences in ho• you are 
raising your children, etc. 
77. How do you think that these differences will affect your 
chi ldn•n? 
78. Have there been any chances in your fa•ily since your 
children were born, such as chances in jobs, child care, •other 
working or not workinc and the like? 
79. If ao, bow do you feel that these chances have affected 
your children? 
80. What are your primary VRluea in child rc11riug? 
.· 
Bl. loo'hnt do you r~elly went to giv~ your r.hi Jdrr•n to J•rq•;.l ,. 
th~• for adult life? 
82. Wh~\ ere your •Kjor worries about or for your childrPn~ 
.· 
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APPENDIX H 
FAMILY COALITION RATING FORM 
AND CODING MANUAL 
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INTRODUC'l' I ON 
FAMILY POOER AND DOCISICN-~KIN:O 
COu.a::TIVE PQoiER DYNAMICS AND <XlALITIONAL 
PROCESSES IN NOmiAL (NOOCLINICAL) FN1ILI~ 
a:>DING MANUAL 
VIDEJJTAPE BEHAVIORAL RATI~ SYSTEM 
This manual will provide a brief explanation of the behavioral rating 
system develo~j for the Family POwer and Decision-Making/Interaction Patterns 
of Normal Families project, which you will be using to rate family videotapes. 
Please read it thoroughly before beginning any ratings. 
You will be rating videotapes of families seen as part of the Familt 
Power and Decision-Making/Interaction Patterns of Normal Families stooy. 
Families are identified through the public school system. They are contacted 
by letter and telephone and are invited to participate in the study if they 
meet the criteria of tw<>-parent intact status with at least one child (theirs) 
between the ages of six and twelve and no family member currently in 
psychotherapy or special program for the handicapped. As part of the testing 
process, families are videotaped for 10 minutes as they engage in a structured 
decision-making task. The task was designed to create a conflict situation 
and to stimulate the fotmation of coalitions between and among fcrnily manl..ers. 
OBJa::TIVES 
The task to be accomplished is threefold: (l) to RECORD coalitions 
(supportive acts) that are observed between family members during the 10-
minute tape segment; (2) to RATE each family's decision-making mode (forced-
choice ratings); and (3) to IDENTIFY the final decision and its originator. 
Therefore, you will be rating 1 videotape for each family according to the 
criteria outlined above, 
COOl~ METHOD 
The coding method involves several steps that should be followed in 
sequence. The step-by-step procedure is outlined below and should guide your 
approach to the videotape coding. 
Step 1: Record identifying information on the rating form. This information 
will be provided for you on the videotape cover. This information will 
include (l) Family IO, (2) Rater ID, (3) Rater Name, (4) Date of Rating, (5) 
Family Members Present (in all instances both Mother and Father will b.~ 
present), (6) Age, Sex and Identifying Information about the children (feel 
free to write in additional infotmation to help you distinguish the children). 
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Step 2: You will view the 10-minute videotape segment through one time to 
familiarize yourself with the family. Ow:ing this first viewing you will only 
be looking for the presentation of ideas by family members. Do NOT look for 
supportive acts at all during this initial viewing. You will record each 
family member's idea for the declsion-making task on the rating form. If a 
family m~mber changes or modifies his/her idea during the 10-minute segment, 
record each idea he/she presents. You will record the family's final decis10n 
and the originator of the idea on the rating fonn. 
Step 3: You will view the 10-minute videotape segment through a second time. 
This time you will be recording the support.iv~ acts you observe during the 10-
minute decision-making task by placing a slash mark in the appropriate box on 
the rating form. Instructions and descriptors of supportive acts will follow 
in this manual, Feel free to express any thoughts, concerns, questions, etc., 
in the space provided for rater's comments. 
Step 4: After completing the tabulation of supportive acts between faruly 
members, you will do two simple calculations using the frequencies you have 
generated, First, you will aggregate the frequencies by dyad as indicated on 
the rating form. For example, you will obtain the frequency of supportive 
acts in the Mother-Father dyad by adding the slash marks in the box reflecting 
Father supporting Mother with the slash marks in the box reflecting Mother 
supporting Father. You will continue this process through the remaining dyads 
as indicated on the rating form. second, you will calculate the total number 
of supportive acts observed in the family videotape by adding together all 
slash marks in the frequency table. 
Step 5: After completing Steps 1-4 above, you will make a global assessment 
of the decision-making mode employed by t:he family in the decision-making 
task. This is a forced-choice response and therefore you must select ONE 
category from those provided on the rating form (i.e., group consens~ 
majority rule, parents' decision, children's decision, individual family 
member decision or other (please specify)). 
For Your Information: Take a break before moving on to the next family 
videotape! Fatigue and viewer fade can be very strong after two viewings of a 
videotape. 
For reliability check and training tapes, two or more raters will reach 
consensus about the REX:ORDINGS of the frequencies of supportive acts between 
family members. When attempting to reach consensus, keep in mind that 
differences in background and experience with children and families will 
affect observations of supportive acts between family members. ow:ing the 
training and reliability sessions it will be useful to discuss differences 1n 
perceptions and hypothesize how your own background and experiences affect 
your perception on the ratings. In addition, group process can also be an 
important and potentially biasing element in rankings using the consensus 
methcd. If possible, try to be aware of the group process that emerges within 
the rater group. 
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RATING SCALE - COALITIONS (SUPPORTIVE ACTS) 
A coalition is defined as e~isting when family members jointly use their 
resources to control a decision. Operationally, a coalition refers to a 
supportive statement or action manifested by one family member toward the 
position, idea or stand of another family member in a conflictual family 
situation (in this stiXly the decision-making task is the conflictual family 
situation). Simple frequencies of observed supPOrtive~ occurring dunng 
the lO-m1nute Vldeotape segment will be recorded by the raters. The follow1ng 
descriptors of the rating scale will provide detailed information on how to 
rate supportive acts between family ~rs. 
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Supportive Acts 
1) Nonverbal behaviors such as head 
nodding or applause immediately 
following the presentation of an 
idea by one family lllE!l'ber. 
2) Directly and/or overtly affiima-
tive statements Unmediately fol-
lowing the presentation of an 
idea by a family lllE!l'ber (e.g., 
"'leah, that's a good/great 
idea"). 
3) Agreement to a modification or 
elaboration of one's own idea by 
another fanily lllE!l'ber. The modi-
fied idea becanes other family 
menber's idea fran then on. 
4) Afficnative responses to solic-
ited opinions about a fam1ly 
member's idea (e.g., a "yes" vote 
when polled about most desirable 
option or idea), 
5) Elaborations on the positive 
aspects of another fanily mem-
ber's idea. 
6) Capitulations and vocalized 
support of another f<~t~ily mem-
ber's idea. 
7) Defense of another family mem-
ber's right to an idea when 
others perceive that lllE!l'ber as 
self-servir¥3, 
8) Afficnations of a family manber's 
general idea (e ,g,, taking a 
trip) accompanied by elaborations 
or specifications (e.g., "Let's 
go to New York"). 
9) A f<~t~ily member's efforts to con-
vince another family II'S!ber to go 
along with yet another f<~t~ily 
JIIEIItler' s idea. 
10) S~m~~ary statement by one family 
member delineati1J3 the "final 
declsion" that incorporate~ 
another f<~t~il y lllB'Iiler 's idea. 
11) Duplication of another family 
member's idea as a supportive act 
unless it occurs in the initial 
presentation of ideas. 
Exclude 
1) Initial presentation of ident1cal 
ideas by family nenbers. (Note: 
Subsequent reiterat1on of identi-
cal ideas will be coderl as 
support for the other fam1ly 
member's position). This is the 
only time bi-directional support 
will be codal. 
2) Simple reiterations of other 
fanily members' positions by one 
family member following a vote-
taking exercise for the purpose 
of clarification. 
3) Statements doubting the practi-
cality or feasibility of another 
family member's idea yet agreeing 
to support the idea conditional 
upon removal of Unpracticalities. 
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VIDWI'APE RATIOO FORM FOR BEHAVIORAL OOSERVATIONS 
OF SUPPORTIVE 1CrS BE'IWEEN FliMit.Y tmmERS 
FCI!Iily ID --------
Rater ID --------
Rater Narte ------------
Date of Rating -----------
Fernily Members Present: 
Father-----
Mother-----
Older C~·ild: Age __ _ Sex 
Identifying Information: 
Younger Chilci: Age __ _ Sex 
!dentifying Information: _______________ _ 
Re: Decision-Making Task 
Father's Idea(s) 
Mother's Idea(s) 
O!der Child's Idea(sJ ______________ _ 
Younge: r"lild Is Idea(s) ________________________ _ 
Final Decision ----------------------------------------
Whose Suggestion _________________________________ _ 
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Iostruct.iODS: ReCOrd the suwortive acts you observe during the 10-minute 
decisio~king task by placing a slash mark in the appropriate 
box. 
Frequency Table of SuPpOrtive Acts Between Family Hembers 
Supporter Father 
Father X 
~!other 
Older Child 
Younger Child 
Rater's Comments: 
Decision-Making l'bde: (Check one) 
Group consensus (all family 
lllll!lbers having to agree) 
Hajority rule --
Parents' deci=si:r:o~n=-------
Children's decision 
ID:!ividual fallily mf!!!·=..,..=r---
decision _______ _ 
~r ____________ __ 
Person Supported 
H:>ther Older Child Younger Child 
X 
X 
X 
Frequencies of Supportive Acts by D'Jad: 
F->11/M->F 
F->0/0->F ---
1!'->Y/Y->F ----
K->O~>H 
K->YIY->H ---
o->Y/Y->0 
~r (~~lcy~J:: ___________ ___ 
TOtal tunber of Supportive Acts: ___ _ 
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VIDEX>TAPE RATINGS OF roALITIONS IN NONCLINICAL FAMILIES 
DURIN:; A 10-MINUTE SIMULATID DEI:ISIClHta.KIN:; TASK 
Filllily ID ------
Rater ID ------
Rater Naue -------------
Date of Rati1'19 ----------
Family Members Present: 
Father----
Mother----
Older Child: Age Sex---
Identifying Information: _____________ _ 
Younger Child: Age Sex 
Identifying Information=--·--------------
Instructions: After viewing the 10-minute decision-making task on videotape, 
make a global assessment of the coalitions you observed between family members. 
Please score the stre1'19th of the 6 types of potential coalitions on a scale of .Q. 
(no coalition present at all) to ro (strongest possible coalition present). 
Coalition T\11?!! 
M->F!F->M 
M->0/0->M 
M->Y!Y->M 
F->0/0...>F 
F->YIY->F 
G->YIY->0 
Other (specify) 
Rater's Ccmnents: 
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